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Abstract
The overall aim of the research presented in this thesis is threefold: To empir-
ically examine monetary transmission to UK retail mortgage rates; to examine why
fixed versus variable rate mortgage lending differs across EU-15 countries; and to build
a DSGE model which can be used for analysing optimal monetary policy in economies
with different proportions of fixed or variable rate mortgage contracts. Chapter 2 in-
vestigates the transmission from UK policy and a range of wholesale money market
rates to retail mortgage rates using a single-equation error correction model (SEECM)
framework, from 1995 to 2009. The results add to previous studies by showing that
the UK retail banking sector is imperfectly competitive at the aggregate level. More
specifically, discounted rates, and to a lesser extent fixed rates behave competitively,
whilst standard variable rates do not, which can be interpreted as evidence of ex-
ploitation of inert borrower behaviour. A snap-shot of the relative levels of variable
rate lending across EU-15 countries is taken in the next Chapter 3, illustrating general
cross-country differences. Risk simulations show that economies more conducive to
variable rate mortgages include those with relatively volatile, persistent, and low in-
flation; low and stable real interest rates; high real income growth; and low correlation
between inflation and real interest rate shocks. Regressions show that macroeconomic
histories may indeed be important determinants of variable rate mortgage prevalence.
The final Chapter 4 integrates a quantity optimising banking sector that lends under
either a fixed or variable rate, into a model with borrowing constrained households.
This provides a framework that can be used to investigate relationships between the
structure of debt contracts and monetary policy. In particular, the propagation of a
productivity shock in the non-durable sector under Ramsey monetary policy is pre-
sented, and it is demonstrated that the introduction of overlapping debt contracts
tempers the effect of the financial multiplier. An appropriate design of the composi-
tion of fixed versus variable rate debt contracts, both their length and interest rate
composition, could therefore reduce the volatility of key economic variables, and so
there are important policy implications.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Aims and Objectives
The overall aim of the research presented in this thesis is threefold: To empirically
examine monetary transmission to UK retail mortgage rates; to examine why fixed
versus variable rate mortgage lending differs across EU-15 countries; and to build a
DSGE model which can be used for analysing optimal monetary policy in economies
with different levels of fixed or variable rate mortgage contracts.
The first chapter aims to provide a detailed account of the transmission from UK
policy and a range of wholesale money market rates to retail mortgage rates from
1995 to 2009. At the same time, another objective is to document the economy-wide
effect of financial market turmoil since August 2007, and show how this has altered
long- and short-term relationships between retail mortgage rates and wholesale money
market rates of the same maturity. In so doing, this chapter aims to show the extent
to which factors such as collusion, exploitation of consumer intertia, menu costs, and
endogenous default risk hinder an otherwise competitive rate-setting process.
A snap-shot of the relative levels of variable rate lending across EU-15 countries is
taken in the next chapter, with the aim of illustrating general cross-country differences,
and to consider whether macroeconomic histories could help to explain them. Some of
1
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the previously presented theory forms the basis of simulations which attempt to show
how the risks associated with either contract, and hence their relative desirability,
vary across different macroeconomic environments. The final objective is to measure
these relative risks with European-wide interest and inflation rate data, to establish
the relative importance of macroeconomic histories, compared to cultural and other
factors in explaining the wide range of variable rate lending levels observed.
In the final chapter, a standard methodological approach is used (DSGE mod-
elling), with the aim of establishing the qualitative differences between economies
with predominantly variable, and those with predominately fixed rate mortgage con-
tracts. The main objective is to construct a model that is rich enough to capture
realistic features of mortgage and housing markets, yet simple enough to allow com-
parison of optimal monetary policy between countries with predominantly variable or
fixed rate contracts.
1.2 Policy Background
Developments in housing markets have received a great deal of attention from mone-
tary policy-makers, especially since many developed countries experienced a significant
rise in house prices over the last decade. With growth in the availability of retail fi-
nancial products this has allowed easier access to equity, and hence spending, fuelling
further house price rises, and so on. This channel, from house prices to consump-
tion via collateral and borrowing, is considered to have been an important source of
macroeconomic instability, particularly in the UK and the US. There is, however, an
institutional characteristic that is strikingly different: the majority of mortgage inter-
est payments in the US are negotiated at long term, nominally fixed rates, whereas in
the UK they are mainly variable. It has been proposed (see for example (Maclennan,
Muellbauer & Stephens 1998), (Treasury 2003), (Miles 2004) and (Calza, Monacelli
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& Stracca 2009)) that countries with variable rate mortgages may be more exposed
to monetary policy changes. Policy messages regarding the desirability of fixed versus
variable rate mortgages though, have been mixed across the Atlantic. In a speech
given at the Credit Union National Association 2004 Governmental Affairs Confer-
ence, Alan Greenspan stated: ‘American consumers might benefit if lenders provided
greater mortgage product alternatives to the traditional fixed-rate mortgage. To the
degree that households are driven by fears of payment shocks but are willing to manage
their own interest rate risks, the traditional fixed-rate mortgage may be an expensive
method of financing a home.’ In contrast, during a speech given in February 2008, the
UK chancellor stated: ‘...we also want to see greater availability of affordable long-
term fixed rate mortgages. For many households, particularly those on low incomes,
fixing the level of mortgage repayments for several years makes real sense; and it can
also contribute to wider macroeconomic stability.’ So although the absence of long-
term fixed rate mortgages in the UK was one of the main reasons proposed for delaying
UK entry into European Monetary Union, there also appear to be other reasons: Al-
leviating the welfare of low income households who cannot smooth consumption, and
promoting macroeconomic stability.
The empirical summary given by (Britton & Whitley 1997) shows how difficult it
is to draw firm conclusions about how fixed versus variable rate mortgages may affect
the transmission mechanism. It clearly acknowledged that households in France and
Germany were using significantly more fixed rate mortgages, but emphasised that this
could only be a structural difference in the presense of credit constraints, which were
likely to be lower in the UK.
Since the Miles Review, it appears that UK government policy has reached a con-
sensus on three points: First, due to financial industry structure, there is a market
failure that causes a short supply of fixed rate mortgage products; Second, that some
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households, presumably borrowing constrained (see (Graham & Wright 2007)) who
are tied to variable rate mortgages suffer from unpredictably variable cash-flows; and
finally, that this increases macroeconomic instability. Although dealing with the new
financial/economic crisis soon took priority after the publication of the Miles Re-
view, all three points appear to have been acknowledged in the Chancellor’s speech
in February 2008.
Against this policy background, the chapters presented in this thesis aim to con-
tribute to any debates regarding the merits of fixed rate mortgage promotion. They
do this by contributing to a better understanding of transmission from policy rates
to retail rates in the UK; by exploring why fixed rate lending may be higher in some
European macroeconomies than others; and by providing a model that can be used to
investigate the fixed-variable rate contract structure that is optimal for social welfare.
1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Overview
The methodology applied to the research presented in this thesis is current main-
stream applied macroeconomics. To some extent, it is an inter-disciplinary mix of
the evolving tools available to the economics profession, including the sub-disciplines
of econometrics and microeconomics. The term ‘applied’ reflects the only clear link
between chapters: that they all stem from an attempt to create frameworks that can
be developed and used to help policy-makers who may be concerned about whether
fixed rate or variable rate mortgage lending should be promoted. The terms ‘current’
and ‘mainstream’ indicate that the analyses and techniques used reflect how macro-
economics is applied in academic research currently. The concepts taken from applied
time-series econometrics; and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium modelling are
very much contemporary. It is likely that had this research been undertaken ten years
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in the past or future it would be done differently, and so to some extent the way ques-
tions are framed and addressed are influenced by current consensuses in the academic
literature.
For Chapter 2, the methodology is carefully developed in section 2.1. The applied
econometric strategy of (Liu, Margaritis & Tourani-Rad 2008) is used, with a single-
equation error correction model (SEECM) to estimate long (equilibrium) and short
term relationships. As is always the case in applied studies of this kind, there is a
trade-off between loosening assumptions (which may be erroneously restrictive and
lead to invalid inference) about the true data generating process on the one hand,
and losing inferential power on the other. For example, the specification employed
here assumes that changes in policy and wholesale money market rates give rise to
changes in retail mortgage rates, but not vice versus. In other words, inference may
be invalid to the extent that retail mortgage rates affect consumer behaviour, which
in turn affects monetary policy and hence wholesale rates. For this reason, the term
‘strategy’ is often used, and the judgement of the researcher is important in deciding
how likely alternative underlying assumptions are. Here, as in (Liu et al. 2008), it was
judged that reverse feedback of this kind is unlikely to be strong enough to warrant
using a less restricted VAR model.
Chapter 3 includes simulations of macroeconomic environments, specified in terms
of inflation, interest rate and income processes that are compatible with real data.
The specification of macroeconomic processes follows (Campbell & Cocco 2003). By
adjusting parameters it is possible to analyse what type of macroeconomies are linked
to risks associated with variable or fixed rate contracts, and hence it is possible to
describe which are more conducive to either type. Once the factors that should encour-
age the establishment of either contract have been identified, they are proxied from
real data across EU-15 countries to provide an indirect description of how ‘variable-
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rate conducive’ their environments are. An attempt is made to simplify the diverse
nature of mortgage lending across Europe by constructing a weighted proportion of
variable rate lending, based on data collected by (Maclennan et al. 1998). There are
inevitably large variations in behaviour and structure, so it is not possible to take
this index too far, however it is used as a dependent variable in a simple regression
to see whether general levels can be explained by the general economic environments
observed across Europe.
1.3.2 DSGE Modelling
A substantial part of this thesis is the construction of a DSGE model in Chapter
4. This now common methodology is usefully summarised in (Kremer, Lombardo,
von Thadden & Werner 2006). Contemporary macroeconomic method is very much
the product of a long conversation between competing ideas. The sometimes fierce
battles, and self-labeling of different schools has encouraged the preservation of the
terms ‘Classical’ and ‘Keynesian’ right up to the present, and perhaps surprisingly,
DSGE modelling can be thought of as not the first, but a second synthesis of the two
paradigms.
In fairly general philosophical terms, the difference between Classical and Keyne-
sian economics has centered on an explanation of economic fluctuations, in which the
former have always had more faith than the latter that nominal prices adjust perfectly
in response to real changes. (Goodfriend & King 1997) argues that there was in fact a
1960s synthesis, popularised by Paul Samuelson, in which it was accepted that wage
and price stickiness caused business cycles in aggregate models, but at the same time
microeconomic analysis was guided by neoclassical principles.
Later, the 1970s were a time of complete disarray, as described in (Mankiw 1990).
Here it is argued that the consensus broke down altogether, thanks to a simultaneous
empirical conundrum (sustained rising unemployment and inflation was incompati-
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ble with the Phillips curve), and a theoretical gap between microeconomic principles
and macroeconomic practise. The sealing of this gap equated to the introduction
of rational expectations, which effectively paved the way for what (Goodfriend &
King 1997) refers to as the ‘New Neoclassical Synthesis’. Although the New Clas-
sical agenda known as the ‘Real Business Cycle’ research programme may not have
produced a satisfactory explanation of economic fluctuations, more or less elaborate
ways of incorporating price rigidities by New Keynesians into their models have been
very successful. According to (Goodfriend & King 1997), the key to the success of
the new synthesis is their shared belief that macro-models should always be properly
micro-founded, an issue which is particularly important with respect to expectations.
In essence, DSGE models are a more general case of Real Business Cycle models,
and the simple addition of a New-Keynesian Phillips curve equation is enough to
produce a model of the new theoretical synthesis. This description however does not
do justice to the effort made by New-Keynesians to base their ideas on as firm as
possible microfoundations, allowing them to enter the same framework.
The general procedure runs as follows. First make your economic assumptions,
deriving (inter-temporal) equations based on individual behaviour. Next find the first
order conditions implied by this (rational optimising) behaviour. Finally, numerical
values have to be assigned to the parameters (calibration), which allows matrices
associated with the system’s recursive form to be determined, before studying its
qualitative features.
The agreement on the importance of internal consistency has dressed macro-
modelling in a more scientific coat. The main advantage of this consensus approach
to model building seems to be one of a shared language within which microeconomic
and econometric developments can be understood. The microeconomic assumptions
made at the beginning can be explicitly altered, and since the final specification of
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the recursive system is the same as an econometric VAR, they can be confronted with
real data. The DSGE model is also like a computational scientific laboratory, where
impulse reponses to external shocks can be studied, and variable moments can be
simulated and compared to the real world.
Whilst comforting to a pure scientist, it is important to remember that although
the conclusions of each DSGE model are internally consistent, they are also inward
looking. Although they can be brought to the data in the form of a VAR, (Juselius
& Franchi 2007) shows that the assumptions made at the first stage may impose
unacceptably severe restrictions on VAR coefficients. This it could be argued, is a
good example of why econometrics and macroeconomics can be thought of not just
as separate sciences, but competing philosophies, where the former prefers to let the
real world ‘speak for itself’, and the latter prefers to confront falsifiable theories with
data. The abstractions made at each stage may illustrate this conflict:
At the first stage, a DSGE analyst should be aware of how their assumptions
relate to the real world, particularly the emphasis placed on rational decision making,
and the difference between individual and aggregate behaviour. It may therefore be
important for applied scientists to combine this standard methodology with other,
more external procedures.
A clear exposition of the differences that can occur between individual and aggre-
gate behaviour when heterogeneity is introduced is provided in (Caballero & Engel
1991). Although valid near the steady state, the typically log-linearised equations are
only approximations of the underlying assumptions, so practitioners should also con-
sider implications of the non-linear model. The use of the term ‘steady state’ instead
of ‘equilibrium’ reflects the importance of the dimension of time (and why the models
are called ‘dynamic’). The language however may also reflect the problematic nature
of defining what equilibrium actually means. At a philosophical level, equilibrium is
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a dicey concept, not least because, like utility, it cannot be directly observed. The
DSGE modelling procedure sheds light on this issue, in the sense that in the linearised
world it is possible to establish whether or not the model has a unique steady state
or not. When models have multiple equilibria, external shocks force strange jumps,
like a ball on a roulette wheel, and with no equilibrium the system explodes. In either
of these cases, analysis is not possible, but at least a description of the nature of the
system is.
(Kremer et al. 2006) points out that DSGE modelling is not immune from the
Lucas critique, which essentially states that policy experiments are valid only when
micro-founded behaviour is unaffected by a policy regime change. Economic behav-
iour can only be guaranteed to be independent for policy changes which are totally
unexpected and unprecedented, and such changes have zero probability of happening.
A similar problem is that the linearised parts of DSGE models also abstract from risk
and uncertainty, despite the fact that impulse response analyses are based on totally
unpredictable shocks.
Nevertheless, despite these issues, across all areas of economics, the DSGE model
has become a workhorse of analysis. To describe optimal monetary policy, Chapter
4 follows recent literature assuming that the central bank is able to fully pre-commit
to a policy plan that all the agents in the economy understand, and that they believe
is credible. Whilst the real world may be different, it is still useful to examine this
benchmark, especially since the language of central banks often suggests that at least
some degree of credible commitment is indeed feasible.
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1.4 Summary of Contributions and Suggested Ex-
tensions
Chapter 2 makes a contribution to the empirical literature that examines monetary
transmission from UK policy and wholesale money market rates, and retail mortgage
rates. It documents both long-term and short-term relationships, as well as the spe-
cific changes that have taken place since the onset of the financial crisis in August
2007. Consistent with previous studies, it shows that the retail banking system in
the UK is subject to imprefect competition, but also that there are clear differences
between different products. Specifically, the dynamics of discounted variable rates
are consistent with perfect compeition, as are, to a lesser extent, fixed rates, whereas
standard variable rates are not. Interpretting this feature, it may be that factors such
as oligopolistic collusion, sunk and menu costs, and endogenous default risk may be
less important than the exploitation of consumer inertia that has been suggested in
the literature. This analysis could be extended to include a richer econometric frame-
work, for example allowing the error correction term to vary smoothly over time,
although at the loss of inferential power. The same analysis could also be applied to
other countries, to see how similar transmission channels differ.
The analysis of Chapter 3 contributes to the understanding of what types of macro-
economic environment are more likely to encourage the general prevalence of variable
rate lending compared to fixed. The trade-offs between macroeconomic parameters
and mortgage risk are of theoretical interest in their own right. They show in par-
ticular, that economies more conducive to variable rate mortgages are those with
relatively: volatile, persistent, and low inflation; low and stable real interest rates;
high real income growth; and low correlation between inflation and real interest rate
shocks. An index of variable rate prevalence across Europe is constructed, and con-
sistent with the theoretical risk simulations, it is actually positively and negatively
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correlated with inflation and interest rate volatility respectively. A natural way to in-
vestigate these issues further would be to adopt the same methodology as (Campbell
& Cocco 2003), with a life-cycle model with stochastic shocks on a representative
household solved by backwards induction on a discrete grid. By repeating simula-
tions of this kind, conclusions could be made on the types of environment that should
favour fixed versus variable mortgages. This extension is left to future work.
In the final chapter, the qualitative monetary policy differences between economies
with predominantly variable, and those with predominately fixed rate mortgage con-
tracts is demonstrated. A contribution is made by constructing a model that combines
features from two others ((Graham & Wright 2007) and (Monacelli 2007)), and then
showing that the extent of fixed versus variable rate lending may be important for
welfare. In particular, the financial sector, by adopting fixed rate mortgages, can play
a stabilising role in the economy. In the future, the parameters of this model can be
adjusted to analyse this issue across countries, and to specifically determine how the
proportion of fixed rate contracts that optimises social welfare varies.
Chapter 2
Monetary Transmission to UK
Retail Rates
It is widely acknowledged (see for example (Goodhart 2008) and (Buiter 2007)) that
9th August 2007 was the beginning of the global financial crisis. In the UK interbank
money market spreads jumped (see figure 2.0.1), and although Northern Rock did not
approach the Bank of England as lender of last resort until September, its sustain-
ability was already in serious doubt. As time passed and more events unfolded, many
previously stable interest rate relationships were affected in the UK, and it became
almost impossible for net borrowers to raise funds on the wholesale money markets
Against this background, this paper analyses how these events have altered the
transmission from UK policy and a range of wholesale money rates to retail mortgage
rates. Although many previous studies have examined the channel from central bank
policy to consumer mortgage payment flows, and hence to the real economy, none
have yet documented the post-August 2007 effect (henceforth referred to as the crisis
period).
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Figure 2.0.1: Spread of LIBOR (3 month) over Policy Rate. Line indicates August
2007.
I contribute to the literature by applying an econometric strategy whose theory
is established in (Phillips & Loretan 1991), and which is applied in (Liu et al. 2008).
Whereas (Liu et al. 2008) looks at how relationships have changed since the intro-
duction of inflation targeting in New Zealand, their paper provides a strong rationale
for using this method (henceforth referred to as the P-L method) in a similar set-
ting. Specifically, we have strong a priori evidence for three features that I maintain
as working assumptions: Firstly, although imperfections in the banking sector may
cause sluggish adjustment to wholesale changes, future expectations of wholesale rates
are also likely to be important determinants of retail rates (see appendix A.6 outlin-
ing a conceptual model proposed by (Mizen, Hoffman & Street 2004)). If so then
estimates of long-run relationships are biased using the standard Engle-Granger pro-
cedure, an issue that is resolved by the P-L method. Secondly, interdependence in
general equilibrium implies that retail bank rate changes should eventually affect the
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real economy, and hence feed back to policy and money market rates. This reverse
feedback however is likely to be neither relatively strong, nor relatively fast, and so
a natural approach to estimating short-run relationships in the literature has been to
assume a partial equilibrium with a single-equation error correction model (SEECM).
The assumptions behind this approach are also covered by (Liu et al. 2008).
Many studies have already looked at how retail bank rates react to monetary policy
in the UK. Early work in this area focused on the question of whether the central
bank was able to alter the cost of retail credit in the long-run. (Dale & Haldane 1998)
found that changes in bank rates actually overshot changes in the policy rate, whilst
(Mariscal & Howells 2002) used an error correction model to examine the impact
of monetary policy on relative borrowing and lending rates. On finding solid long-
run relationships between policy and individual rates, but not on differentials, they
argued that monetary policy was therefore unlikely to be effective in altering economic
activity through this channel.
The most prolific contributor to this literature is Shelagh Heffernan, with a series
of papers which take as their starting point the observation that retail banking is
subject to imperfections which delay and obscure transmission. In theory, profit
maximising financial intermediaries working under perfect competition with complete
information and no adjustment costs should fully pass changes on, symmetrically
and instantaneously. Instead there may be oligopolistic collusion between banks;
dynamic exploitation of consumer inertia; sunk and menu costs; and the possibility of
endogenous default (where an increase in mortgage payments may lead to an increase
in the probability of default, and hence alter revenue as a function of rates). Any one
of these factors alone could lead to sluggish and asymmetric adjustment.
In (Heffernan 1997) an error correction approach is applied to monthly data from
1986-93 on generic deposit and loan rates, showing that there are considerable dif-
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ferences in rate-setting behaviour between banks, which exhibit many features of
imperfect competition. Similar studies, with similar methodologies and findings are
later applied in different contexts: (Heffernan 2006) analyses small business loans,
and (Fuertes & Heffernan 2006) disaggregates both between and within banks. The
possibility of a non-linear re-adjustment process is allowed for in (Fuertes, Heffernan,
Kalotychou & Row 2006) and (Fuertes, Heffernan, Kalotychou & Row 2008). These
studies consider the increasingly popular relaxation of the classic, constant and linear
error correction model, into richer specifications that allow the error correction term
to vary over time. A comprehensive background to these approaches is provided by
(Tong 1993) and (Franses & Van Dijk 2000). For threshold autoregressive models
(TAR), once a chosen variable crosses a threshold, the error correction mechanism
may switch. When the error-correction term itself is the threshold variable, they are
known as self-exciting threshold autoregressive models, or SETARs (for an evaluation
of their performance see (Clements & Smith 1999)). The assumption of a discrete
switch can also be relaxed so that it may smoothly move across a threshold in smooth
transition autoregressive models, STARs (for an application see (Liu 2001)).
A very large sample (662 different rate histories between 1993-2004) is analysed in
(Fuertes & Heffernan 2009) in a linear framework, again finding that there are con-
siderable differences in pass-through and re-adjustment speed between banks. They
also link this heterogeneity to other bank-specific variables that capture performance,
and find that limited branch networks and managerial accountability to shareholders
have a positive effect on adjustment speed.
In contrast to all previous work, I focus on the impact of the post-crisis disruption
on economy-wide links between policy and money market rates, and retail mortgage
rates, which are themselves important determinants of household income flows and
generally acknowledged to provide an important monetary policy channel (see (Britton
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& Whitley 1997)). I analyse 17 pair-wise relationships between money market and re-
tail mortgage rates of the same maturity using aggregate monthly data from the Bank
of England database for the period from January 1995 to May 2009. In the long-run
I find evidence of a contrast between the discounted mortgage rates that banks use
to initially attract customers, and standard variable rates, with pass-through com-
plete for the former but not for the latter. For fixed rate mortgages, pass-through
is generally complete. Since the crisis, for eight of the estimated relationships I find
strong evidence in the long-run of both a significant jump in equilibrium spreads,
and a fall in pass-through, whilst in the short-run there is a considerable weakening
of the process that re-adjusts retail rates back towards their equilibrium with the
money market. Although I do not find strong statistical evidence for an asymmetric
re-adjustment process before August 2007, retail mortgage rates generally take con-
siderably longer to move back towards their equilibrium with wholesale rates during
times when they are relatively expensive. These results add to previous studies by
showing the extent to which the UK retail banking sector is imperfectly competitive
at the aggregate level, and also suggest that discounted rates are used as a highly
competitive loss-leader product. The following section describes the methodology,
followed by analytical results in section 3, and section 4 concludes.
2.1 Methodology
I closely follow the procedures of (Liu et al. 2008), which draw on theoretical re-
sults derived by (Phillips & Loretan 1991). Since interest rates are generally not
found to behave significantly different from unit root processes, the P-L method starts
with a long-run equation, as used in the familiar Engle-Granger procedure. Crucially
however, the possibility of a more general process is allowed for with the following
triangular system of long-run equations:
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rt = α0 + α1it + ε1t (2.1.1)
it = it−1 + ε2t, (2.1.2)
where α0 is the long-run mark-up of retail over wholesale rates and α1 captures the
proportion of (unexpected) changes in wholesale rates that eventually ‘slip’ or pass-
through to retail rates. Pass-through is said to be complete when α1 is not significantly
different from 1, whilst α1 < 1 suggests an imperfectly competitive financial sector. If
ε1t is stationary, this implies cointegrated interest rates, so that direct OLS estimates
of the parameters are super-consistent, although standard inference has to be adjusted
for the non-standard parameter distributions. An often overlooked problem though,
is that a priori it is reasonably likely that ε1t and ε2t are correlated, because retail
bank profitability may depend on anticipating future expected changes in wholesale
rates, especially if there are costs associated with adjusting rates. Appendix A.6
provides a conceptual model of forward-looking rate-setting which would cause such
a correlation.
The P-L method is hence a happy medium between an unrestricted VAR-type
model whose coefficients are difficult to interpret, and the Engle-Granger estimates
which are super-consistent, but likely to suffer from small sample bias and non-
standard asymptotic parameter distributions. More specifically, the P-L method adds
lagged error correction terms to counteract autocorrelation of ε1t, and present, past
and future first differences of it, to remove the effect of correlation between ε1t and
ε2t. At the same time, past policy surprises, and future policy settings are accounted
for, and the framework provides a simple way of testing for structural breaks. The
long run (P-L) parameters with their associated shifts at the beginning of the crisis
period, are derived by non-linear least squares estimation of the following equation:
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rt = α0 + α1it + α2D + α3Dit +
K∑
k=1
θkεt−k +
L∑
i=−l
µi∆it−i + vt, (2.1.3)
where D is a dummy variable equal to zero before the crisis period, and one
thereafter; and εt is the disequilibrium of the long-run relationship calculated from
rt − α0 − α1it − α2D − α3Dit. The parameters α2 and a3 capture any long-run
mark-up and pass-through shifts that occurred at the start of the crisis period. After
establishing the long-run relationships, we can then focus on the short-run dynamics
that govern the way rates re-equilibrate. I estimate the SEECM with retail rates as
the dependent, endogenous variable:
∆rt = β0∆it + β00D∆it + δε̂t−1 +
x∑
i=1
βi∆it−i +
y∑
i=1
γi∆rt−i + vt, (2.1.4)
where β0 and β0 + β00 capture how much of a change in wholesale rates instan-
taneously passes through to retail rates before and after the crisis respectively. The
error correction parameter δ indicates the strength of the re-adjustment mechanism,
whilst the lagged differences of retail and wholesale rates capture all other short-run
dynamics.
After establishing how parameters shifted after the crisis, I then follow (Liu et al.
2008) again by searching for asymmetry of the re-adjustment mechanism. This is
achieved by running a similar short-run equation, but with a dummy variable λ,
equal to 1 when mortgage rates are above their equilibrium level, that is when the
lagged disequilibrium term is positive, and zero when they are below equilibrium:
∆rt = β0∆it+β00∆it+δ1λε̂t−1+δ2(1−λ)ε̂t−1+
x∑
i=1
βi∆it−i+
y∑
i=1
γi∆rt−i+vt. (2.1.5)
I am hence able to investigate whether or not the mechanism that moves retail
mortgage rates towards their equilibrium with wholesale rates on impact, is stronger
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or weaker, depending on whether retail rates have (temporarily) moved above or below
their equilibrium position relative to wholesale rates.
The linear error correction process provides a simple, parsimonious way of docu-
menting the effects of the relatively small sample of observations from the post-crisis
period. However, no allowance is made for the possibility of varying parameters such as
the error correction terms over time. Plots of the disequilibrium terms, together with
a reflection on the series of events during the financial crisis suggest there may have
been increases in volatility, and perhaps a weakening of the process that re-adjusts
rates towards their (new) equilibrium. In all cases the post-crisis period was asso-
ciated only with positive disequilibria. A non-linear error correction process, driven
by variables that reflect the new mortgage market risk premia of the period (perhaps
related to unemployment and house price forecasts) may more closely describe the
true underlying data-generating process. At the same time, with so many new events,
and not a very long run of observations, I did not consider it worth applying any
of the growing number of non-linear specifications in the literature 1. Instead, the
asymmetric analysis is restricted to the more reliable and consistent pre-crisis period.
Evidence for asymmetry can be revealed by testing the null hypothesis that δ2 = δ3
with a standard parameter restriction Wald test. Additionally, given potentially low
power for this test, a comparison of the short-run adjustment processes is made by
comparing what (Hendry 1995) refers to as the Mean Adjustment Lag (MAL) of the
two different (above and below equilibrium) regimes. It works by treating the esti-
mated relationship as if it were deterministic. Once stripped down into levels, the
MAL is a weighted average of all the lags of the underlying processes, in this case
capturing the average length of time it takes retail rates to respond to movements in
1The bilinear model proposed by (Peel & Davidson 1998) may be appropriate, given that during
the crisis it is likely that risk-premia would not be constant. For applications of non-linear models
see (Fuertes et al. 2006) and (Fuertes et al. 2008).
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wholesale rates. Appendix A.5 provides a full description of how Hendry’s formula is
applied in this study.
Although many previous studies outlined in the introduction have searched for and
found asymmetry in this context, none have done so at an aggregate level for the UK,
nor specifically looked at how the setting of Discounted Variable Rate (DVR) differs
from Standard Variable Rate Mortgages (SVR). I follow previous studies which inter-
pret relatively long re-adjustment times for above-equilibrium regimes as indicative
of imperfectly competitive bank behaviour. To the extent that the financial sector as
a whole is slower to shift rates when they are uncompetitively priced at high levels,
this is consistent with the collusive oligopoly and exploitation of consumer inertia
arguments proposed in the literature. I am able to more carefully scrutinise this
latter claim in particular, since after the two-year period during which DVRs are dis-
counted (and re-set each period), they automatically revert back to SVRs. Evidence
outlined in (Callaghan, Fribbance & Higginson 2007) and elsewhere suggests that
many borrowers do face significant problems obtaining the time, information, and
psychological energy required for continuously searching and re-mortgaging towards
the most competitive financial products. Given also that complex penalties, risks,
and both financial and subliminal loyalties may be built in to contracts, DVRs could
plausibly be used to entice borrowers, in much the same way that many businesses use
‘loss-leaders’ to physically draw customers into their selling-environment. I therefore
interpret more uncompetitive behaviour in the setting of SVRs compared to DVRs
as supportive evidence for these features, whilst documenting their extent during the
pre-crisis period from January 1995 to August 2007.
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2.2 Data and Analysis
I use monthly data provided on the Bank of England website for 18 different interest
rate series containing 173 observations from January 1995 to May 2009, plus one series
of corporate bond rates from Thomson Datastream. All series are complete except
for the DVRs, which only became available from April 1998 (and which therefore
contain 134 observations). The whole series covers a timespan of more than 14 years,
including more than 3 years of the post-crisis period. Table 2.2.1 provides a summary
of the variables.
Table 2.2.1: Summary of Data
Rate Description Code
Short Rates
DVR Discounted Variable Mortgage Rate IUMBV48
SVR Standard Variable Mortgage Rate IUMTLMV
P1 Official Policy Rate IUMBEDR
G1 Government Bond Rate 1
LIBOR Interbank Rate (3 month) IUMAMIJ
B1 Interbank Rate (2 month) 1
Long Rates
F2 Fixed Mortgage Rate (2 year) IUMBV34
F3 Fixed Mortgage Rate (3 year) IUMBV37
F5 Fixed Mortgage Rate (5 year) IUMBV42
F10 Fixed Mortgage Rate (10 year) IUMBV45
G2 Government Bond Rate (2 year) 1
G3 Government Bond Rate (3 year) 1
G5 Government Bond Rate (5 year) 1
G10 Government Bond Rate (10 year) 1
B2 Interbank Rate (2 year) 1
B3 Interbank Rate (3 year) 1
B5 Interbank Rate (5 year) 1
B10 Interbank Rate (10 year) 1
C10 Corporate Bond Rate (10-15 year) 2
1. Extracted from the Bank of England commercial bank and government liability yield curves 
provided on the f inancial market data section of their w ebsite.
2. 'UK Corporate Bond Yield' taken from Thomson Datastream based on the Sterling Aggregate 
Index compiled by Lehman Brothers 
Since DVRs and SVRs are re-priced by banks each month, the analysis compares
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them with short wholesale rates, including the average official policy rate, and short
gilt and interbank yields. For fixed mortgage rates, I compare their behaviour to gilt
and commercial interbank lending rates of the same maturity. Whilst the structure
of such yields are not directly comparable to a mortgage that is nominally fixed for
a period, before reverting to a standard variable rate, these analyses offer a guide to
the cost of funding such mortgages from wholesale money markets. It is postulated
here that by capturing elements of the term structure contained over the same time
horizon, any differences in the dynamic behaviour of retail rates are more likely to
reflect imperfections in the financial sector. To the extent that the appropriate expec-
tations of inflation and risk premia over the same time horizon are captured and thus
conditioned, this analysis sheds light on financial sector frictions, rather than term
structure features.
2.3 Equilibrium Relationships
I follow (Liu et al. 2008) in drawing on the theoretical results of (Phillips & Loretan
1991) to derive the long-run equilibria between wholesale money market and retail
mortgage rates. First of all, I check the two assumptions that have usually been found
in the literature, that the underlying interest rates behave in a non-stationary (unit-
root) way, and that they cointegrate in the long-run. Appendix A.1 shows time-series
plots of all 17 pairs of interest rates, with their associated spreads. In all cases there is
clearly a very strong degree of co-movement, and a maintained economic assumption
of this paper is that there is a firm long-run relationship between retail mortgage
rates and the associated money market rates that financial institutions borrow and
lend at. Even when there are imperfections in the banking sector, it is hard to
imagine rates wandering away for too long, and competitive forces not eventually
intervening to restore some kind of equilibrium. The results and a summary of the
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formal stationarity and cointegration tests are presented in appendices B and C.
Without emphatic evidence that the interest rates cannot be treated as non-stationary,
and that their relationships cannot be treated as cointegrated, I again follow (Liu
et al. 2008) by proceeding with the P-L method. It can be argued that the imposition
of discete values for orders of integration may be unrealistic anyway, in which case
there are obviously problems with these tests. (Beechey, Hjalmarsson &
"Osterholm 2009) for example develops procedures for testing interest rates when they
are near integrated (so the cointegrating vector is not restricted to [1,−1]). (Fuertes
& Heffernan 2009) also discusses the issue of comovement and cointegration, which
we do not explore further here.
(Phillips & Loretan 1991) showed how asymptotically median unbiased and ef-
ficient estimators could be derived with a range of equivalent methods, namely full
systems maximum likelihood; fully modified OLS; systems estimation in the frequency
domain; single-equation band spectral estimation; and finally non-linear ECM esti-
mation. Their study systematically analysed the latter method, and stressed the
importance of including leads of first differences of the regressors in single-equation
ECMs (SEECMs). Without such augmentation, the efficiency, unbiasedness, and re-
tention of standard properties for valid inference fail. At the same time they also
showed that, given non-stationarity of the underlying (cointegrated) processes, lagged
first differences of the variables (in our case lags of ∆rt and ∆it) did not adequately
remove the effects of the past history of errors on the long-run relationship (in our
case ε1t). Whilst OLS on linear SEECMs with differenced lags of both variables would
be computationally simpler, a non-linear least squares (NLS) procedure is necessary.
To estimate the long-run equations (3), (4), and (5) presented in section 2, I also
follow their prescription of NLS estimation applied to the non-linear-in-parameters
equations that include lagged disequilibrium terms.
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Given the structure and assumptions of (Phillips & Loretan 1991), the P-L es-
timator has asymptotic equivalence with the more popular (full systems maximum
likelihood) Johansen procedure, but with the added benefit that we can more easily
interpret its natural endogenous-exogenous structure. The next practical problem we
face is that of choosing the number of lags and leads to include in the equations pre-
sented in section 2. Although other work at the time (see (Saikkonen 1991) and (Stock
& Watson 1993)) developed the asymptotic theory of regressions with leads and lags,
only more recently have practical procedures been devised for their selection. In the
context of lag selection for unit-root testing, (Ng & Perron 1995) explores how to trade-
off between parsimonious models with size distortions and over-parameterised models
which suffer from low power. They showed that general-to-specific procedures with
sequential t- and F-tests outperformed the minimisation of information criteria. For
cointegrated models with leads however, (Kejriwal & Perron 2008) have extended the
analysis of (Saikkonen 1991) and found the opposite: Akaike and Bayesian information
criteria (AIC and BIC) can be validly used for the leads and lags regression (which
they refer to as ‘dynamic OLS’) under slightly weaker assumptions; and simulations
find smaller mean squared errors and better coverage rates for confidence intervals.
(Choi & Kurozumi 2008) also includes analysis of the less well known Cp criterion
which minimises the expected squared sum of forecast errors (see (Mallows 2000)).
Their simulations show that a simplified approximation of this criterion is the best at
reducing bias, whilst BIC is the most successful at reducing mean squared errors. In
this study I use the Cp criterion, but also undertake a sensitivity analysis using AIC
and BIC (for a description of how these criteria are applied see Appendix A.4.1). The
following two sections summarise the estimation results for the 17 pair-wise relation-
ships analysed between variable rate mortgages and short money market yields, and
between fixed rate mortgages and money market yields fixed for the same maturity.
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2.3.1 Variable Mortgage Rates and Short Yields
Table 2.3.1 presents the estimated long-run relationships between SVRs and wholesale
rates. The slope coefficients under the second column show that SVRs are most
strongly linked to gilt yields, with 87% of adjustments passing through to SVRs. For
interbank rates there is 80% pass-through, whilst only 77% of changes in the policy
rate are fully reflected by SVRs in the long-run. Generally speaking, we can say that
the way banks set SVRs is not very closely tied to conditions in wholesale markets,
with column 7 showing that there is strong evidence in the data to reject the null of
complete pass-through.
This contrasts strongly with the long-run relationships for DVRs observed since
April 1998, presented in Table 2.3.2. Between 93% and 103% of adjustments to
wholesale rates are eventually fully reflected in DVRs, and there is no strong evidence
to reject the hypothesis that in the long-run, there is a one-to-one link from policy,
gilt, and interbank yields through to DVRs. Compared to SVRs this suggests that
banks set DVRs in a more efficient and competitive way.
Another contrasting feature between Tables 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 is the estimated level of
equilibrium spreads. Whilst the equilibrium wholesale mark-up for SVRs is around 2.5
percentage points (and 285bps above policy rate), the cost of DVRs is insignificantly
different from any of the interbank, government and policy rates.
Moving to the post-crisis period, column 4 shows that the pass-through from policy
to SVRs fell significantly (by 6 percentage points down to 71%). In the long-run, the
evidence for a long-term break in the link between wholesale and mortgage rates was
strongest for DVRs and LIBOR. Pass-through fell by 10 percentage points, and the
null of complete pass-through was rejected post-crisis, but not pre-crisis.
There were also significant shifts in the long-run mark-up from policy to SVRs
(up 380bps), and even larger jumps in the spreads from gilt and interbank rates
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to DVRs (up 550 and 570bps). To the extent that the DVR mortgage market is
more competitive, this latter result could be interpreted as reflecting increases in
mortgage market risk premia caused by mortgage-specific factors such as worsening
unemployment and house-price forecasts.
Table 2.3.1: Long Run Pass Through to Standard Variable Mortgage Rates
Short Rate R2 DW
Constant Slope Constant Slope Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
Policy 2.85c 0.77c +0.38c -0.06c 1.00 2.02 0.000 0.000
(8.3) (12.1) (5.3) (-4.8)
T-Bill 2.42c 0.87c +0.18 -0.02 0.99 1.96 0.007 0.002
(3-month) (9.5) (17.8) (p=0.105) (p=0.357)
LIBOR 2.61c 0.80c -0.25 +0.03 0.99 1.97 0.000 0.005
(3-month) (8.8) (14.8) (p=0.219) (p=0.339)
Interbank 2.55c 0.80c -0.17 +0.02 0.99 2.00 0.000 0.002
(2-month) (8.7) (15.2) (p=0.245) (p=0.338)
1. Pre-crisis includes monthly observations from Jan 1995 to and including July 2007, post-crisis from August 2007 to May 2009.
2. P-values for Chi-Squared Test, Slope Coefficient restricted =1 (small value indicates evidence for incomplete pass through)
Significance levels of 5%, 1%, and 0.1% are indicated by superscript a, b, and c respectively, numbers in brackets indicate t-ratios
except for insignificant coefficients, for which associated p-values are given instead.
Pre-Crisis1 Post-Crisis Effect Ho: Complete Pass Through2
Table 2.3.2: Long Run Pass Through to Discounted Variable Mortgage Rates
Short Rate R2 DW
Constant Slope Constant Slope Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
Policy 0.41 0.93c +0.60a -0.09 0.97 2.02 0.478 0.072
(p=0.399) (9.5) (2.4) (p=0.057)
T-Bill 0.04 1.03c +0.55b -0.08a 0.99 2.05 0.724 0.478
(3-month) (p=0.918) (12.7) (3.07) (-2.4)
LIBOR 0.31 0.93c +0.57b -0.10b 0.99 2.04 0.174 0.001
(3-month) (p=0.206) (19.3) (3.0) -2.9
Interbank 0.15 0.96c +0.35a -0.06 0.99 2.06 0.540 0.117
(2-month) (p=0.653) (14.6) (2.1) (p=0.071)
1. Pre-crisis includes monthly observations from Jan 1995 to and including July 2007, post-crisis from August 2007 to May 2009.
2. P-values for Chi-Squared Test, Slope Coefficient restricted =1 (small value indicates evidence for incomplete pass through)
Significance levels of 5%, 1%, and 0.1% are indicated by superscript a, b, and c respectively, numbers in brackets indicate t-ratios
except for insignificant coefficients, for which associated p-values are given instead.
Pre-Crisis1 Post-Crisis Effect Ho: Complete Pass Through2
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2.3.2 Fixed Mortgage Rates and Long Yields
The long-run links between fixed mortgage rates, and gilt, interbank, and corporate
bond yields of the same maturity are shown in Tables 2.3.3 and 2.3.4. In all cases, the
links are very tight, with pass-through ranging from 95% to 105% (except from cor-
porate bonds with 92% pass-through), and no rejections of the complete pass-through
hypothesis other than from 3-year gilts to 3-year fixed rates. Another characteristic
that indicates a competitive fixed rate mortgage market is the fairly tight long-run
spreads, which for the interbank rates are insignificantly different from zero in all
cases except for at 3-year maturities. Equilibrium spreads over gilts range from 0.61
percentage points for 2-year rates, up to 1 percentage point for 3-year maturities, in
all cases significantly cheaper than the SVR spreads. At this point it is worth pointing
out that, just as DVRs revert back to SVRs after the pre-agreed 2-year period, so do
fixed rates revert back to SVRs at maturity. The fixed rate mortgage market appears
to be more competitive than SVRs, and again this is consistent with the idea that
banks use fixed rates (though to a lesser extent than DVRs) as loss-leader products
to entice borrowers into deals which later become less competitive.
After the crisis, the fall in pass-through and rise in equilibrium spread is even more
clear-cut: For all but the 10-year fixed rates link with 10-year gilts, there was both a
significant reduction in pass-through (from 6 to 14 percentage points), and increase in
equilibrium spreads (from 44 to 80 percentage points). Another feature of the crisis
period is that, for 3-year interbank rates, the hypothesis of complete pass-through to
fixed rates is rejected (but not before the crisis).
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Table 2.3.3: Long Run Pass Through from Government Bond to Fixed Mortgage
Rates
Maturity R2 DW
Constant Slope Constant Slope Pre-Crisis Whole-Sample
Two Year 0.61a 0.98c +0.60c -0.08c 0.98 2.00 0.674 0.034
(2.4) (20.8) (4.1) (-2.7)
Three Year 0.91c 0.97c +0.56c -0.07 0.98 2.01 0.352 0.023
(4.7) (27.0) (3.3) (p=0.056)
Five Year 0.83b 1.00c +0.36 -0.05 0.99 1.97 0.986 0.362
(2.8) (18.5) (0.064) (p=0.192)
Ten Year 1.20b 0.98c +0.39 -0.08 0.99 2.03 0.849 0.323
(2.7) (12.4) (p=0.178) (p=0.231)
1. Pre-crisis includes monthly observations from Jan 1995 to and including July 2007, post-crisis from August 2007 to May 2009.
2. P-values for Chi-Squared Test, Slope Coefficient restricted =1 (small value indicates evidence for incomplete pass through)
Significance levels of 5%, 1%, and 0.1% are indicated by superscript a, b, and c respectively, numbers in brackets indicate t-ratios
except for insignificant coefficients, for which associated p-values are given instead.
Pre-Crisis1 Post-Crisis Effect Ho: Complete Pass Through2
Table 2.3.4: Long Run Pass Through from Interbank Loan to Fixed Mortgage Rates
Maturity R2 DW
Constant Slope Constant Slope Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
Two Year 0.35 0.96c +0.44b -0.06a 0.98 1.99 0.518 0.052
(p=0.272) (17.6.) (4.7) (-3.6)
Three Year 0.60a 0.95c +0.48b -0.07a 0.99 2.00 0.291 0.007
(2.3) (21.2) (3.0) (-2.5)
Five Year 0.18 1.04c +0.64c -0.10c 0.99 1.97 0.333 0.121
(p=0.414) (27.2) (4.0) (-3.4)
Ten Year 0.55 1.02c +0.70a -0.13 0.99 1.91 0.751 0.165
(p=0.078) (19.1) (2.0) (p=0.066)
Ten Year 0.58 0.92c +0.65a -0.11b 0.99 2.02 0.587 0.158
(Corporate) (p=0.51) (6.7) (2.4) (-2.8)
1. Pre-crisis includes monthly observations from Jan 1995 to  and including July 2007, post-crisis from August 2007 to  May 2009.
2. P-values for Chi-Squared Test, Slope Coefficient restricted =1 (small value indicates evidence for incomplete pass through)
Significance levels of 5%, 1%, and 0.1% are indicated by superscript a, b, and c respectively, numbers in brackets indicate t-ratios
except for insignificant coefficients, for which associated p-values are given instead.
Pre-Crisis1 Post-Crisis Effect Ho: Complete Pass Through2
2.4 Short Run Adjustment
2.4.1 Estimation
To estimate the short-run equation 2.1.4, the number of differenced lags of the exoge-
nous (x) and endogenous (y) variable were selected with Bayesian information criteria
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(BIC). Using a maximum lag-length of 4, I optimised BIC across all possible combi-
nations of x and y, to derive the chosen SR(x, y) models whose results are presented
in Tables 2.4.1-2.4.4. The first and fourth columns of these Tables give the values of
β0 and β00 from equation 2.1.4, the proportion of a change in wholesale rates that
instantaneously slips through to retail rates before the crisis, and the change in this
parameter after the crisis. The re-adjustment coefficient δ is shown in columns 2
and 5 (before the crisis, and the change after the crisis respectively), and indicates
the strength of the re-adjustment process towards equilibrium (the proportion of a
disequilibrium that is immediately ‘corrected’). We would normally expect this para-
meter to be negative, given that there is a long-term equilibrium, since positive values
imply an error-exploding, rather than self-correcting process. Finally, columns 3 and
6 show the results of calculating the Mean Adjustment Lag (MAL), before and after
the crisis (see Appendix A.5). The MAL is an average measure of how long it takes
for a disequilibrium between wholesale and retail rates to disappear. Since there are
both error-correction terms and differenced lags in the final models, this calculation is
important in clarifying the general speed of the short-term adjustment of retail rates
following changes in wholesale rates.
2.4.2 Variable Mortgage Rates and Short Yields
Table 2.4.1 shows the estimated short-run relationships for SVRs and DVRs respec-
tively. The instantaneous re-adjustment in column 2 is considerably stronger in all
cases for DVRs compared to SVRs, indicative of more competitive behaviour. Imme-
diate pass-through was not significant for interbank rates, but again the larger values
for DVRs with respect to policy and gilt yields suggest a more immediately compet-
itive DVR-setting process than for SVRs. The MALs on the other hand are longer
for DVRs in all cases. This suggests that early on, banks are quicker to pass on the
rate changes to DVRs, but then it takes longer on average for the whole change to
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be reflected in DVRs. Columns 4-6 show how short-run adjustment changed after the
crisis. In all cases, the change in instantaneous pass-through was insignificant, and
all re-adjustment parameters became weaker (less negative). Caution is required in
interpreting the MALs, where they are based on a relatively small number of observa-
tions (and in some cases were negative with no meaningful interpretation). Generally
speaking, MALs are much longer in the post-crisis period, which probably illustrates
a looser link between wholesale and retail rates after the crisis.
Table 2.4.1: Short Run Pass Through to Variable Mortgage Rates
Short Rate
MAL
4
MAL
4
Pass Through
2
Re-Adjustment
3
Pass Through
2
Re-Adjustment
3
SVR
Policy 0.18c -0.09c 0.8 -0.08 +0.15b 1.9
(4.0) (-3.5) (p=0.183) (2.7)
T-Bill 0.12b -0.14c 3.3 -0.09 +0.08c 4.9
(3-month) (2.6) (3.7) (p=0.221) (2.0)
LIBOR 0.08 -0.17c 2.8 +0.06 +0.22a -
(3-month) (p=0.217) (-4.6) (p=0.395) (2.4)
Interbank 0.01 -0.13c 4.8 +0.07 +0.03 2.9
(2-month) (p=0.868) (-3.5) (p=0.322) (p=0.602)
DVR
Policy 0.60c -0.19b 3.0 -0.15 +0.20b -
(6.7) (-3.2) (p=0.146) (-3.2)
T-Bill 0.33c -0.20b 3.7 -0.14 +0.18a 22.7
(3-month) (4.0) (-3.1) (p=0.149) (2.6)
LIBOR 0.40c -0.29c 4.0 -0.03 +0.21c 7.7
(3-month) (4.9) (-5.7) (p=0.729) (3.3)
Interbank -0.12 -0.27c 5.3 +0.14 +0.18c 7.9
(2-month) (p=0.151) (-7.0) (p=0.157) (4.3)
1. Pre-crisis includes monthly observations, Jan 1995 to  and including July 2007, post-crisis from Aug 2007 to  May 2009.
2. Impact pass through indicates how much of a change in wholesale rates is immediately passed through to  retail rates.
3. Impact Re-Adjustment is the size o f the equilibrium correction parameter.
4. Mean Adjustment Lags, indicate how long it takes retail rates to  adjust to  changes in wholesale rates (see App A .5).
5. Significance levels o f 5%, 1%, and 0.1% indicated by superscript a, b, and c respectively, numbers in brackets indicate t-ratios
except for insignificant coefficients, for which associated p-values are given instead.
Post-Crisis1Pre-Crisis1
ImpactImpact
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2.4.3 Fixed Mortgage Rates and Long Yields
The re-adjustment parameters in Table 2.4.2 suggest that the fixed rate mortgage
market link to treasury bill, as opposed to interbank lending, is slightly stronger.
Re-adjustment parameters are marginally stronger for gilts at all maturities, and
MALs shorter at 3, 5, and 10-year maturities. As for short rates, the post-crisis
changes cannot be measured with accuracy, however in all cases there was a significant
weakening of the re-adjustment process.
Table 2.4.2: Short Run Pass Through to Fixed Mortgage Rates
Maturity
MAL
4
MAL
4
Pass Through
2
Re-Adjustment
3
Pass Through
2
Re-Adjustment
3
T -B ill
Two Year 0.10 -0.24c 4.4 +0.10 0.22c 17.7
(p=0.051) (-5.4) (p=0.315) (4.6)
Three Year 0.09 -0.27c 4.0 +0.13 +0.23c 10.2
(p=0.061) (-5.7) (p=0.183) (4.5)
Five Year 0.15c -0.17c 4.6 +0.14 +0.19c -
(3.7) (-4.7) (p=0.109) (4.6)
Ten Year 0.17b -0.14c 5.1 -0.03 +0.05 4.6
(3.0) (-4.7) (p=0.819) (p=0.499)
Interbank
Two Year 0.13b -0.23c 4.3 +0.21 +0.24 -
(2.7) (-5.6) (2.4) (4.7)
Three Year 0.12b -0.22c 4.4 +0.04 +0.17c 9.1
(2.4) (-4.8) (p=0.687) (3.3)
Five Year 0.18c -0.17c 4.5 +0.06 +0.18c -
(4.4) (-4.9) (p=0.498) (4.2)
Ten Year 0.18b -0.10c 6.1 +0.07 +0.12b -
(3.0) (-3.4) (p=0.597) (2.6)
Ten Year 0.05 -0.10
c
11.4 -0.05 +0.11
c
-
(Corporate) (p=0.502) (-4.6) (p=0.652) (4.1)
1. Pre-crisis includes monthly observations, Jan 1995 to  and including July 2007, post-crisis from Aug 2007 to  May 2009.
2. Impact pass through indicates how much of a change in wholesale rates is immediately passed through to  retail rates.
3. Impact Re-Adjustment is the size of the equilibrium correction parameter.
4. M ean Adjustment Lags, indicate how long it takes retail rates to  adjust to  changes in wholesale rates (see App A .5).
5. Significance levels o f 5%, 1%, and 0.1% indicated by superscript a, b, and c respectively, numbers in brackets indicate t-ratios
except for insignificant coefficients, for which associated p-values are given instead.
ImpactImpact
Pre-Crisis1 Post-Crisis1
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2.4.4 Asymmetric Adjustment
Now we turn to the question of whether bank rate-setting behaviour varies according
to whether retail rates are above or below their long-term equilibrium with wholesale
rates. Some of the literature discussed in the introduction links oligopolistic com-
petition between banks, and other inertia to asymmetric adjustment of rates. Such
imperfections may mean that banks are relatively slow to re-adjust during ‘expensive’
(above equilibrium) periods than during the ‘cheap’ (below equilibrium) regimes. If
so, then we interpret evidence for asymmetry as evidence for an imperfectly compet-
itive financial sector. A time series plot of all rates is provided in appendix A.1. In
all cases except for the fixed rate relationship with corporate bonds, the post-crisis
period almost exclusively associated with positive disequilibria. We also know that
this was a time when many events were unfolding. As discussed in previous sections, I
do not relax equations 2, 4, and 5 to allow for time-varying error-correction (which is
likely to have weakened), and volatility (which is likely to have increased). There are
many possible candidate, non-linear models that could capture these features, but the
limited observations may not warrant such an approach. For the asymmetry analysis
in particular however, there is a clear danger that including the post-crisis period may
distort the estimation, possibly biasing the above-equilibrium parameters upwards, as
well as causing invalid inference. At the cost of less observations, I adopt a conserv-
ative approach by excluding the post-crisis sample from this analysis, thus avoiding
the danger that we have not appropriately captured the changes after August 2007.
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Table 2.4.3: Asymmetric Adjustment of Variable Mortgage Rates
Short Rate Ho: Asymmetry6
Pass
Through
2
Above
5
Below
5
Above
5
Below
5
SVRs
Policy 0.36c -0.31c -0.23c 1.6 -0.5 0.340
(4.9) (-5.0) (-4.3)
T-Bill 0.11a 0.17c -0.12a 3.1 1.5 0.171
(3-month) (2.4) (-3.5) (-2.6)
LIBOR 0.16b -0.17c -0.09 2.7 1.4 0.178
(3-month) (2.7) (-3.4) (p=0.064)
Interbank 0.20 -0.17c -0.11a 4.2 3.6 0.142
(2-month) (p=0.728) (-3.5) (-2.4)
DVRs
Policy 0.49 -0.19b -0.13 2.8 1.2 0.576
(5.7) (-2.6) (p=0.125)
T-Bill 0.26c -0.23c -0.30c 4.6 3.0 0.319
(3-month) (3.7) (-5.4) (-4.3)
LIBOR 0.37c -0.26c -0.23c 3.7 3.4 0.713
(3-month) (5.1) (-4.7) (-3.5)
Interbank -0.08 -0.30c -0.27c 5.1 4.7 0.604
(2-month) (p=0.255) (-8.0) (-5.1)
1. Pre-crisis includes monthly observations from Jan 1995 up to  and including July 2007.
2. Impact pass through indicates how much of a change in wholesale rates is immediately passed through to retail rates
3. Impact Re-Adjustment is the size o f the equilibrium correction parameter
4. Mean Adjustment Lags indicate how long it takes retail rates to  adjust to  changes in wholesale rates (see App A .5)
5. 'Above' and 'below' indicate regimes when deviation from long-run equilibrium is positive and negative respectively.
6. P-values for Chi-Squared Test on general restriction that re-adjustment parameters for the two regimes are equal
 (small values indicate evidence of asymmetry).
7. Significance levels o f 5%, 1%, and 0.1% indicated by superscript a, b, and c respectively, numbers in brackets indicate
t-ratios except for insignificant coefficients, for which associated p-values are given instead.
Impact
Re-Adjustment
3
MAL
4
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Table 2.4.4: Asymmetric Adjustment of Fixed Mortgages
Maturity Ho: Asymmetry6
Pass
Through
2
Above
5
Below
5
Above
5
Below
5
T -bills
Two Year 0.10a -0.21c -0.25c 4.4 2.0 0.616
(2.0) (-4.0) (-3.3)
Three Year 0.12a -0.12c -0.56c 5.4 0.7 0.005
(2.6) (-3.5) (-3.4)
Five Year 0.14c -0.16c -0.21b 4.9 2.3 0.454
(3.6) (-3.7) (-3.2)
Ten Year 0.15b -0.16c -0.19c 5.5 5.9 0.625
(2.7) (-5.1) (-3.3)
Interbank
Two Year 0.13a -0.19c -0.22b 4.3 2.0 0.705
(2.6) (-3.9) (3.0)
Three Year 0.11a -0.22c -0.20b 4.0 2.3 0.702
(2.5) (-4.0) (-3.0)
Five Year 0.20c -0.24c -2.1b 4.0 2.4 0.538
(5.1) (-4.7) (-3.2)
Ten Year 0.19c -0.26c -0.24c 4.9 3.1 0.817
(3.3) (-6.3) (-4.2)
Ten Year 0.08 -0.09c -0.08 8.7 14.6 0.945
(corporate) (p=0.205) (-3.9) (p=0.060)
1. Pre-crisis includes monthly observations from Jan 1995 up to  and including July 2007.
2. Impact pass through indicates how much of a change in wholesale rates is immediately passed through to  retail rates
3. Impact Re-Adjustment is the size o f the equilibrium correction parameter
4. M ean Adjustment Lags indicate how long it takes retail rates to  adjust to  changes in wholesale rates (see App A.5)
5. 'Above' and 'below' indicate regimes when deviation from long-run equilibrium is positive and negative respectively.
6. P-values for Chi-Squared Test on general restriction that re-adjustment parameters for the two regimes are equal
 (small values indicate evidence of asymmetry).
7. Significance levels o f 5%, 1%, and 0.1% indicated by superscript a, b, and c respectively, numbers in brackets indicate
t-ratios except for insignificant coefficients, for which associated p-values are given instead.
Re-Adjustment3
Impact MAL4
The p-values given in the last column of Table 2.4.3 suggest that there is slightly
stronger statistical evidence of asymmetry (and hence imperfect competition) for
SVRs, although this evidence is not significant. The MALs shown in columns 4 and
5 however, suggest that banks take longer to re-adjust rates during above equilibrium
regimes. Pass-through from both LIBOR and treasury bill rates to SVRs takes on
average, twice as long when SVRs are relatively expensive, compared to when they
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are relatively cheap, which can be interpreted as evidence of imperfect competition.
A similar story is given for fixed rate mortgages shown in Table 2.4.4, although
strong statistical evidence for asymmetry was found for the 3-year rate relationship
with gilt yields. It takes nearly 8 times longer for 3-year fixed rates to re-adjust when
they are above equilibrium than when they are below.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper I have investigated the dynamic relationships between a range of whole-
sale money markets, and comparable mortgage rates of the same maturity, to show
how competitive forces differ between different types of mortgage product, and to
see how much these relationships have been altered by the post-August 2007 financial
market turmoil. I show the extent to which frictions (whether through a lack of compe-
tition or otherwise) prevent fully competitive rate-setting for three types of mortgage:
discounted variable rate mortgages (DVRs), standard variable rate mortgages (SVRs),
and fixed rate mortgages (FRs). Across three types of dynamic analysis (long-run,
short-run, and asymmetry) I find evidence that supports the hypothesis that banks
may exploit consumer inertia by using DVRs, and to a lesser extent FRs, to entice
borrowers in to ‘cheap’ deals that later may revert back to SVRs.
Firstly, using the P-L method to investigate long-run relationships I find that
banks tend to pass rate changes fully on to DVRs, generally to FRs, but not to SVRs.
Secondly, the short-run dynamics show that banks tend not to pass any instan-
taneous changes onto SVRs, whereas they do for DVRs, and that the readjustment
process is stronger in the latter case. On average however, it takes longer for rate
changes to pass fully onto DVRs.
Finally, there is no strong statistical evidence that banks alter their rate-setting
behaviour depending on whether retail mortgage rates are above or below their equi-
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librium with wholesale rates. It does however, take considerably longer for banks to
re-adjust rates during above equilibrium regimes for SVRs, which again is indicative
of imperfect competition in this market.
As for the post-crisis effect, there is strong evidence that both long-run and short-
run relationships have been significantly altered. Since the crisis, for eight of the
estimated relationships I find strong evidence in the long-run of both a significant
jump in equilibrium spreads, and a fall in pass-through, whilst in the short-run there
is a considerable weakening of the process that re-adjusts retail rates back towards
their equilibrium with the money market.
For future work, given the complex chain of events since August 2007, the use
of an exogenous time-varying error correction term, that depends on stress in the
financial system may be appropriate. Different measures of financial stress could be
tested against each other, to find which of them are the most successful at capturing
the weakening of the error correction process. The candidates for such a variable need
not be restricted to individual series. (Illing & Liu 2006) for example, develop a way
of compiling an index in Canada that captures stress in the financial system using a
range of financial variables.
Chapter 3
Lending Levels in EU-15 Countries
3.1 Introduction
The predominance of Fixed-Rate (FR) compared to Variable-Rate (VR) mortgage
lending differs considerably across Europe. It has been observed that1 the UK’s mort-
gage system is predominately variable-rate, whilst FR mortgages appear to persist in
the Eurozone. Understanding the nature and extent of this diversity, is an important
policy issue, because in the event of the UK joining EMU it represents a potential
source of asymmetry in the transmission of monetary policy. This chapter presents
evidence that, despite obvious differences in institutional histories, differences in the
macroeconomic environments of EU-15 countries could be important in explaining
this diversity.
Previous research2 points to an explanation based on non-rational behaviour, fo-
cusing on information problems faced by UK mortgage consumers. The simulations
presented in this chapter however, show that macroeconomic environments with rela-
tively volatile inflation and relatively stable real interest rates favour the adoption of
VR mortgages, and that the history of these variables in the UK is consistent with a
more rational explanation.
1See, for example (Britton & Whitley 1997)
2See (Miles 2004)
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The chapter is broken down into three sections. Section 3.2 develops a theory
of FR versus VR mortgage choice based on two distinct types of risk. FR contracts
expose borrowers and lenders to the risk that unexpected changes in inflation and real
interest rates alter the real discounted net present value of the contract, a concept
defined in (Campbell & Cocco 2003) as ‘wealth’ risk. Although the real discounted
net present value of VR contracts is more stable, borrowing constraints may bind
more severely when high interest rates coincide with low incomes, forcing immediate
painful reductions in consumption. The risk that borrowers experience these liquidity
problems is greater under a VR contract, and defined as ‘income’ risk.
Having derived equations that allow these risks to be quantified, section 3.3 uses
calibrated parameters to generate a baseline simulation measuring the size of wealth
and income risk. By adjusting parameters and re-running the simulations, the elastici-
ties of wealth and income risk with respect to macroeconomic parameters is measured,
leading to a final statement of what kinds of environment favour VR mortgages.
Section 3.4 presents a summary of how relevant different macroeconomic environ-
ments are as an explanatory factor of different levels of FR vs VR mortgage lending
across the EU-15. The log of an index of VR lending is regressed onto a range of
variables including the means and standard deviations of inflation and real interest
rates throughout the 80s and 90s, and proxies for credit market liberalisation (which
should reduce income risk), and credit constraints (which should increase income risk).
Section 3.5 concludes the findings.
3.2 Measuring Wealth and Income Risk
3.2.1 Wealth Risk
To illustrate the concept, Table 3.2.1 below shows a simple example of wealth risk.
The periods shown here are quarterly, where inflation is expected (pe) to remain stable
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throughout the year at an annual rate of 2%, and real interest rates (r) are stable
at 3%. In reality, inflation turns out to be higher than expected, rising steadily to
an annual rate of 8%. If someone took a fixed-rate mortgage out at the beginning of
the year, then ignoring tiny second order effects, the competitive nominal rate would
be simply 5% per annum, or ignoring compounding, 1.25% per quarter. Imagine, for
simplicity that the contract involves borrowing £100,000, which is paid back at the
end of the year. This means the nominal cash flow (nmcf ) evolves as shown in the 5th
column. When making a decision at t = 0 however, it is not nominal cash flows, but
real discounted cash flows that are relevant, so in column 6 there are the real discount
factors (rdf ) based on the expected course of inflation and real interest rates. Using
market rates in this way assumes that the borrower has the same access to capital
markets as the lender.
From the borrower’s perspective, the real discounted cash flow (rdmp) sums to
-£100,000, confirming that the fixed-rate is indeed competitive. Moving across to
what actually happens, the agreement of a fixed-rate leaves the nominal cash flow
unchanged, but the appropriate real discount rates shift downwards. Assessing the
borrower’s decision at time t = 0, they unexpectedly gained almost £3000 of real
discounted wealth at the expense of the lender. Similarly, had inflation unexpectedly
fallen they would have lost to the benefit of the lender.
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Table 3.2.1: Wealth Risk
Fixed-Rate Contract
Expected Actual
t p
e p fr nmcf rdf rdmp fr nmcf rdf rdmp
1 0.50% 0.50% 1.25% 1,250 0.988 1,235 1.25% 1,250 0.988 1,235
2 0.50% 1.00% 1.25% 1,250 0.975 1,219 1.25% 1,250 0.971 1,213
3 0.50% 1.50% 1.25% 1,250 0.963 1,204 1.25% 1,250 0.949 1,187
4 0.50% 2.00% 1.25% 101,250 0.952 96,342 1.25% 101,250 0.924 93,545
Total: 100,000 97,180
NPV? -£100,000 -£97,180
Variable-Rate Contract
t p
e p Expected Actual
vr nmcf rdf rdmp vr nmcf rdf rdmp
1 0.50% 0.50% 1.25% 1,250 0.988 1,235 1.25% 1,250 0.988 1,235
2 0.50% 1.00% 1.25% 1,250 0.975 1,219 1.75% 1,750 0.971 1,699
3 0.50% 1.50% 1.25% 1,250 0.963 1,204 2.25% 2,250 0.949 2,136
4 0.50% 2.00% 1.25% 101,250 0.952 96,342 2.75% 102,750 0.924 94,931
Total: 100,000 100,000
NPV? -£100,000 -£100,000
In the same Table, the example of a VR contract is given below. This shows
that as the nominal mortgage rate automatically increases in response to the rising
inflation, this compensates evenly for the falling discount factor. This ensures that
the net present value of the contract remains at exactly -£100,000 throughout the
year, and illustrates the wealth stability of the VR contract.
The same principle applies to real interest rates — if they unexpectedly rise, then
again the borrower on the FR gains unexpectedly at the expense of the lender, but
with the VR contract wealth is stable.
Under the following assumptions, the variable-rate contract offers pure stability of
real discounted wealth (for both the borrower and the lender):
1. There is no one-period uncertainty over inflation and real interest rates
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2. Lenders are competitive, and if they require risk premia, and premia for admin-
istration/transactions costs, these premia are stable and constant over time
3. The inflation and discount rates faced by the borrower are the same as the
lender, which is more likely if they have access to the same financial capital
markets. This essentially is equivalent to assuming that borrowers can adjust
an asset/debt portfolio of their own, and so do not face any credit constraints.
4. Lenders’ expectations are the same as borrowers’ expectations, or equivalently,
they have the same information set.
3.2.2 Derivation of Wealth Risk Equation
Define r as the real interest rate, π the inflation rate, and for convenience define the
variable x = r + π + rπ. Subscripts refer to time (where F is the final period of the
contract), and superscript e is the expectations operator.
The competitive fixed-rate, ignoring premia is the solution to:
FR0
(1 + xe1)
+
FR0
(1 + xe1)(1 + x
e
2)
+ ...+
FR0 + 1
(1 + xe1)(1 + x
e
2)...(1 + x
e
F )
= 1
FR0 =
[
(1 + xe1)(1 + x
e
2)...(1 + x
e
F )− 1
(1 + xe2)(1 + x
e
3)...(1 + x
e
F ) + ...+ (1 + x
e
F ) + 1
]
(3.2.1)
The accumulated unexpected gain in real discounted net present value to the borrower,
evaluated at time t = 0 (where ND is the nominal debt value of the loan) is:(
FR0
(1+xe1)
− FR0
(1+x1)
)
ND +
(
FR0
(1+xe1)(1+x
e
2)
− FR0
(1+x1)(1+x2)
)
ND + ...
+
(
FR0+1
(1+xe1)(1+x
e
2)...(1+x
e
F
)
− FR0+1
(1+x1)(1+x2)...(1+xF )
)
ND
Dividing by ND and rearranging gives:
FR0
(
1
(1+xe1)
+ 1
(1+xe1)(1+x
e
2)
+ ...+ 1
(1+xe1)(1+x
e
2)...(1+x
e
F
)
− 1
(1+x1)
− 1
(1+x1)(1+x2)
− ...− 1
(1+x1)(1+x2)...(1+xF )
)
+ 1
(1+xe1)(1+x
e
2)...(1+x
e
F
)
− 1
(1+x1)(1+x2)...(1+xF )
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By construction, the expected terms multiplied by FR0 sum to 1, so this leaves:
1−
[
FR0
(
1
(1+x1)
+ 1
(1+x1)(1+x2)
+ ...+ 1
(1+x1)(1+x2)...(1+xF )
)
+ 1
(1+x1)(1+x2)...(1+xF )
]
(3.2.2)
The measure of wealth risk used is the standard deviation of this quantity when the
competitive fixed-rate is equal to its mean:
ρW = SD
[
1−
[
(µ+ r¯)
(
1
(1+x1)
+ 1
(1+x1)(1+x2)
+ ...+ 1
(1+x1)(1+x2)...(1+xF )
)
+ 1
(1+x1)(1+x2)...(1+xF )
]]
(3.2.3)
3.2.3 Income Risk
To the extent that the previous assumptions are true, the FR contract is riskier than
the VR contract. The lender may be unwilling to take this risk on, and so may transfer
this cost to the borrower by charging a risk premium. Either way, the VR contract
is superior, so why is there a market for FR mortgages? Without exploring issues
related to fundamental uncertainty, a plausible explanation is that credit constraints
may expose borrowers to the danger that high interest payments coincide with periods
of low income, forcing immediate, painful reductions in consumption.
The same example shown in Table 3.2.2 includes the assumption that the borrower
begins with a real income of £5000 per quarter. Real discounted labour income
is calculated by discounting with each period inflation (p), and multiplying by real
labour income growth (l). In this simple example these are equal (6% per annum),
so they offset each other, and the stream of real discounted labour income (rdl) is
fixed at £5000. A borrower facing credit constraints will experience problems when
their real discounted mortgage payments (rdmp) are high as a proportion of their
real discounted labour income (their debt servicing burden, dsb, is high). In the same
example, this ratio for the FR contract steadily falls from 25% to 23%, whilst for the
VR contract this rises sharply to 51%.
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Table 3.2.2: Income Risk
Fixed-Rate Contract
Expected Actual
t r l rate nmcf rdf rdmp rdl dsb rate nmcf rdf rdmp rdl dsb
1 0.75% 0.75% 1.25% 1,250 0.988 1,235 5,000 25% 1.25% 1,250 0.988 1,235 5,000 25%
2 0.75% 0.75% 1.25% 1,250 0.975 1,219 5,000 24% 1.25% 1,250 0.971 1,213 5,000 24%
3 0.75% 0.75% 1.25% 1,250 0.963 1,204 5,000 24% 1.25% 1,250 0.949 1,187 5,000 24%
4 0.75% 0.75% 1.25% 1,250 0.952 1,189 5,000 24% 1.25% 1,250 0.924 1,155 5,000 23%
Variable-Rate Contract
Expected Actual
rate nmcf rdf rdmp rdl dsb rate nmcf rdf rdmp rdl dsb
1.25% 1,250 0.988 1,235 5,000 25% 1.25% 1,250 0.988 1,235 5,000 25%
1.25% 1,250 0.975 1,219 5,000 24% 1.75% 1,750 0.971 1,699 5,000 34%
1.25% 1,250 0.963 1,204 5,000 24% 2.25% 2,250 0.949 2,136 5,000 43%
1.25% 1,250 0.952 1,189 5,000 24% 2.75% 2,750 0.924 2,541 5,000 51%
Unlike wealth risk, income risk is not symmetrical between borrower and lender,
indeed it is unlikely to affect lenders at all, and should only affect borrowers who face
liquidity constraints. (Benito & Mumtaz 2006) have estimated that the proportion
of UK households facing such constraints is between 20% and 40%. These house-
holds display excess sensitivity of consumption in the sense of not smoothing their
consumption to the full extent implied by the life-cycle model. They also find that
young, unmarried, non-white, degree-educated households without liquid assets, and
with negative home equity are more likely to be liquidity constrained. To the extent
that these groups are also more likely to be mortgage borrowers, the proportion of
borrowers affected by income risk may be higher than this estimate.
3.2.4 Derivation of Income Risk Equation
If lt is the real labour income growth rate, α is the loan:income ratio, and mrt the
mortgage rate, then for a mortgage contract initiated in period 0, the debt-servicing
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burden in time t, evaluated at time t = 0 is:
dsbt =
present value of real discounted mortgage payment
present value of real discounted income
=
(
mrt
(1+x1)(1+x2)...(1+xt)
∗ND
)
(
(1+l1)(1+l2)...(1+lt)
(1+r)1(1+r)2...(1+r)t
∗ ND
α
)
For the VR contract, H periods after the contract was agreed this will be:
ρIV = SD
[
α
(
xF
(1 + x1)(1 + x2)...(1 + xH)
)(
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)...(1 + rH)
(1 + l1)(1 + l2)...(1 + lH)
)]
And for the FR contract, the risk when the fixed-rate is at its mean is:
ρIF = SD
[
α
(
(µ+ r¯)
(1 + x1)(1 + x2)...(1 + xH)
)(
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)...(1 + rH)
(1 + l1)(1 + l2)...(1 + lH)
)]
The measure of income risk associated with choosing a VR contract instead of a FR
contract is then measured as:
ρI = ρIV − ρIF
The following section uses this equation, with the previous wealth risk equation (ρW
) in simulations, to analyse the effect of varying macroeconomic parameters.
3.3 Theoretical Trade-Offs from Risk Simulations
Having established a simple theory of FR and VR mortgage risk, their size depends
on the level of inflation, real interest rate, and labour income uncertainty. This
chapter follows (Campbell & Cocco 2003) by assuming the following processes, without
decomposing real labour income growth into temporary and permanent income shocks:
πt = µ(1− φ) + φπt−1 + εt, εt ∼ N [0, σ
2
ε]
rt = r¯ + ψt, ψt ∼ N
[
0, σ2ψ
]
lt = l¯ + δt, δt ∼ N [0, σ
2
δ ]
In some of their analysis (Campbell & Cocco 2003) allowed for interest rate and
inflation shocks to be correlated, so the simulations here allow for cross-correlation of
all three error terms. The relative attractiveness of the two contracts is considered
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over a given time horizon. A fixed-rate contract length of four years is used as a
medium term financial decision horizon in this analysis.
To investigate risk trade-offs, the baseline parameters were varied, one at a time,
across a sensible range, from 0.4% to 3.6% in all cases except cross-correlations of error
terms which were varied between -0.8 and +0.8. The curve extrapolation toolbox of
MATLAB was then used to derive smooth functioned curves describing the risk trade-
offs between parameters and wealth and income risk.3 A cubic polynomial equation
was used for all parameters except inflation persistence, which required a Gaussian fit4
due to the asymptotic increase in risk as the parameter approaches one. The size of
wealth risk as a percentage of income risk, which can be considered as (an unweighted)
measure of the ‘VR conduciveness’ of a particular macroeconomic environment, is
plotted on the following graphs.
Figure 3.3.1 shows that ‘VR conduciveness’ is positively related to the standard
deviation of inflation shocks (sigmap), because as this parameter is increased, the
unpredictability of wealth associated with the FR contract (wealth risk) increases
at a faster rate than the unpredictability of payment shocks mainly associated with
the VR contract (income risk). The standard deviation of real interest rate shocks
(sigmar) on the other hand, is a negative function of VR conduciveness, because as
this parameter increases, wealth risk increases at a slower rate than income risk.
Figure 3.3.2 shows that VR conduciveness is a decreasing function of both mean
inflation and mean real interest rates, but increases with mean real income growth.
This is because as average levels of inflation and real interest rates increase, wealth
risk falls and income risk rises, whereas high income growth reduces income risk and
leaves wealth risk unaffected. Figure 3.3.2 also shows that the mean real interest rate
parameter is more ‘VR conducive elastic’ than mean inflation, because the curve is
3Graphs illustrating all the fitted wealth and income risk curves are provided in Appendix B.
4Using the equation: a1 ∗ e−((x−b1)/c1)
2
+ a2 ∗ e−((x−b2)/c2)
2
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Figure 3.3.1: Volatility Parameters and VR Conduciveness
steeper across the whole range of parameter values.
For low levels of inflation persistence, figure 3.3.3 shows that VR conduciveness
is relatively unaffected by this parameter. Above 0.4 however, VR conduciveness
increases faster, reaching a peak at 0.65, before falling at an increasing rate towards
1. This is because wealth risk increases at a steadily increasing rate, whilst income
risk increases at a slower rate between 0 and 0.7, before rising exponentially.
Changes in VR conduciveness brought about by changes in cross-correlations of
the error terms were negligible, except for the correlation between inflation and real
interest rate shocks. As this parameter increases, wealth and income risk both in-
crease, but wealth risk rises at a slightly faster rate, resulting in a slow fall in VR
conduciveness.
The annualised parameters (ignoring small compounding differences) used in the
baseline simulations are shown in Table 3.3.1, together with the point elasticities of
wealth and income risk at the baseline. The more positive (negative) these values, the
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Figure 3.3.3: Inflation Persistence and VR Conduciveness
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larger is the percentage increase (decrease) in risk given a 1% increase in the value of
the parameter. The last column shows wealth risk elasticity less income risk elasticity,
a measure of the ‘VR conduciveness’ of the parameter, in particular, the percentage
increase in wealth risk associated with the FR contract over and above the percentage
increase in income risk associated with the VR contract, given a 1% increase in the
parameter.
Table 3.3.1: Annualised Parameters
Parameters Baseline Wealth ηw Income ηI VR Conduciveness
Elasticity
Inflation
μ 2% -0.11 0.09 -0.19
φ 0.5 0.6 0.26 0.34
σε 2% 0.79 0.6 0.18
Real Interest
r 2% -0.08 0.17 -0.25
σψ 2% 0.21 0.4 -0.19
Real Income
l 2% 0 -0.08 0.08
σδ 2% 0 0 0
Correlations
σδψ 0 0.43 0.46 -0.03
Time Horizon 4 years
It should be noted that although sticky inflation appears as the most VR conducive
parameter in the Table, this is only the case in the region close to the baseline value
of 0.5. For values between 0 and 0.2, and between 0.65 and 1, it was shown earlier
that VR conduciveness is a decreasing function of φ.
In general, in decreasing order of magnitude, Table 3.3.1 shows that the following
macroeconomic conditions favour the development of VR mortgages, ceteris paribus:
• Volatile/persistent inflation
• Low mean real interest rate
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• Stable real interest rate
• Low mean inflation rate
• High mean real income growth
• Low correlation between inflation and real interest rate
3.4 Explaining Levels of VR/FR Mortgage Lend-
ing Across EU-15
3.4.1 VR/FR Mortgage Prevalence Across EU-15
Having established what kind of macroeconomic environment might be expected to
favour the development of VR mortgage contracts, this section looks at how lending
actually differs across the EU-15. The following table shows an index of how pre-
dominant VR mortgages are, constructed from data presented in a paper on EU-15
financial market asymmetries5. The UK is not alone with its predominately variable-
rate mortgage system: there is more lending at variable-rates in Luxembourg and
Sweden, and VR mortgage contracts appear to prevail in Austria, Portugal and Fin-
land. France and Denmark, on the other hand, appear to be at the opposite extreme,
with almost all lending at fixed-rates, and in Denmark’s case usually for time periods
extending to the full 20 or 25 year term.
A detailed discussion of the different regulatory and financial histories is also
given in (Maclennan et al. 1998), with no systematic patterns emerging. Denmark,
Germany, Sweden, Holland, Austria and Finland are lumped together as ‘mortgage
bank systems’ which raise wholesale funds by selling bonds to institutional investors
with no significant local branch networks. The UK, Ireland, France and Spain, on the
other hand, are dominated by deposit-taking systems where retail savings institutions
5(Maclennan et al. 1998)
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Luxembourg 97
Sweden 93
UK 80
Portugal 67
Finland 60
Austria 67
Ireland 57
Spain 53
Germany 53
Greece 47
Italy 27
Holland 28
Belgium 25
France 13
Denmark 7
Table 3.4.1: Variable-Rate Mortgage Prevalence Index
transform the savings of millions of households into long-term mortgages. Credit
market liberalisation is considered most complete in UK, Spain, Finland and Sweden.
Whilst institutional histories are likely to be important factors, the relative levels
of VR and FR lending may also be explained by macro-economic histories. It is
important to be aware that there is a ‘chicken and egg’ style conundrum here, because
deciphering causation direction is required, in the sense that macro-environments are
themselves likely to be a function of institutional histories. Here it is simply proposed
that the two are inter-twined to the extent that it is possible to think of them as the
same phenomenon.
The following section 3.4.2 tests this hypothesis by regressing the log of the above
index onto the means and standard deviations of inflation and interest rates through-
out the 80s and 90s, with credit constraint proxies as additional explanatory variables.
Significance of these variables, and signs that are consistent with the relationships
presented in the previous section can be thought of as evidence supporting this hy-
pothesis.
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3.4.2 Explaining Levels of VR/FR Mortgage Lending Across
EU-15
Table 3.4.2 shows the variables considered in a regression of the log of the VR index,
Ln(VI). These include the means and standard deviations of inflation and nominal
interest rates, based on quarterly data from 1980 (Q1) to 1998 (Q2) of the CPI and
Long term government bond rates, accessed via Datastream. To the extent that
credit-constraints exist in an economy, income risk should be higher, and hence vr
lending should be lower, so two variables are included to proxy credit-constraint.
There is extensive literature on the measurement of credit constraints, amongst which
(Jappelli & Pagano 1989) have presented detailed evidence that internationally, debt
to gdp ratios are a good proxy for the extent of credit constraints. Given that credit
market liberalisation can be thought of as an opposing measure, a ‘liberalised credit
market’ dummy variable for UK, Spain, Finland and Sweden is also included.
Table 3.4.2: Regression Variables
 Ln(VI) NomiSD InflSD NomiMean Libdummy CreditCons MeanInfl
Denmark -1.15 4.50% 0.90% 10.80% 0 65 1.00%
France -0.89 3.20% 1.00% 9.70% 0 21 1.10%
Belgium -0.6 2.60% 0.70% 9.10% 0 22 0.80%
Italy -0.57 4.20% 1.20% 12.50% 0 7 1.80%
Holland -0.55 1.70% 0.60% 7.70% 0 60 0.60%
Greece -0.33 2.10% 2.30% 19.20% 0 6 3.60%
Germany -0.28 1.50% 0.60% 7.10% 0 51 0.70%
Spain -0.28 3.50% 1.10% 12.30% 1 22 1.70%
Ireland -0.24 3.60% 1.50% 10.70% 0 27 1.30%
Finland -0.22 1.90% 1.00% 7.40% 1 30 1.10%
Austria -0.17 1.60% 0.80% 7.50% 0 32 0.80%
Portugal -0.17 4.90% 2.10% 14.40% 0 26 2.80%
UK -0.1 2.30% 1.10% 9.80% 1 57 1.30%
Sweden -0.03 2.30% 1.10% 10.70% 1 51 1.30%
Lux -0.01 1.60% 0.80% 7.80% 0 22 0.80%
The variables in Table 3.4.2 are arranged in order of significance (size of t-statistic)
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from most significant to the least. A regression on the standard deviation of nominal
interest rates and inflation, with the liberalised credit market dummy yields:
ln(V I) = −0.33− 0.3(NomiSD) + 0.9(InflSD) + 0.1(LibDummy) + e
p-values: (0.02) (0.00) (0.28) (0.00)
R
2
= 0.72
The variables in this regression yield signs that are consistent with the theory and
simulations presented in the previous sections: volatile (stable) interest rates have a
negative (positive) effect on the VR index; volatile inflation has a positive effect; and
credit market liberalisation (reducing income risk) has a positive effect
Although the volatility of inflation and interest rates (NomiSD and InflSD) are the
only variables significant at the 5% level, An F-test on the coefficient for LibDummy
restricted to zero was insignificant. Further regressions without either of these two
variables increases AIC, lowers R
2
, and does not change the sign of any of the other
variables.
Figures 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 show scatter plots of the VR Index against inflation volatil-
ity (InflSD), and nominal interest rate volatilty (NomiSD) respectively, with a fitted
OLS regression line. Their respective upwards and downwards slopes confirm the idea
that inflation volatility is a positive function, and interest rate volatility a negative
function, of VR lending prevalence, but that individually these variables are not very
good at explaining the variation observed across EU-15 countries.
3.5 Conclusion
The simulations show that economies more conducive to variable-rate mortgages are
those with relatively volatile, persistent, and low inflation; low and stable real interest
rates; high real income growth; and low correlation between inflation and real interest
rate shocks. An index of variable-rate prevalence has been constructed, and consistent
with the theoretical risk simulations, it is positively and negatively correlated with
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Figure 3.4.1: Scatter Plot of VR Prevalence and Inflation Volatility
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inflation and interest rate volatility respectively. A four variable model including
a dummy for credit market liberalisation and mean interest rates is also consistent
with the theoretical trade-offs. This regression over-predicts the extent of variable-
rate lending in France, Finland and Denmark, under-predicts Luxembourg, Spain and
Italy, whilst fairly accurately predicting VR mortgage prevalence in Austria, Portugal,
Ireland, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Greece and UK. Other factors that
could be relevant, but which are not analysed in this chapter include fiscal and other
types of incentive, and cultural habit-formations.
The regression analysis of the EU-15 presented in this chapter suggests that the
UK’s relatively volatile inflation combined with its relatively stable interest rates from
1980 to 1998, may help to explain why the general level of fixed-rate (variable-rate)
mortgage lending is relatively low (high) compared to other EU-15 countries, in a way
that is consistent with associated mortgage risks.
Chapter 4
Optimal Monetary Policy
4.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the social benefits of fixed versus variable rate debt contracts,
by looking at the transmission of productivity shocks under fully optimal (Ramsey)
monetary policy. We integrate a quantity-optimising banking sector that lends under
either fixed or variable rates within a model with borrowing constrained households,
providing a framework that can be used to investigate the relationships between the
structure of debt contracts, and the monetary policy transmission mechanism. In
particular we study the propagation of a productivity shock in the non-durable sector
under Ramsey monetary policy. The introduction of overlapping debt contracts tem-
pers the effect of the financial multiplier. Although the implied steady state allocation
of resources unambiguously reduces the deterministic component of social welfare, an
appropriate design of debt contracts, their length and the interest rate composition,
can reduce volatility of the key economic variables, so that the financial sector can
play a stabilising role in the economy. We demonstrate that an intermediate ratio of
fixed and variable rate debt contracts is socially optimal.
Our economy is populated by households who would like to borrow under collateral
of durable goods and by households who are willing to lend. In a similar way to
(Iacoviello 2005), (Kiyotaki & Moore 1997), and (Campbell & Hercowitz 2005), we
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introduce heteregeneity by assuming some households are relatively impatient. The
distinction between two fundamentally different groups of households is a useful device
that naturally gives rise to borrowing constraints and debt. The optimising behaviour
of households naturally implies that the impatient households become borrowers and
the patient households become lenders.
We allow households to increase borrowing if they provide enough collateral.1 We
require a good that can be used as collateral and employ a two good — two factor
model, similar to the one developed in (Monacelli 2007), (Calza et al. 2009), and
(Monacelli 2009). Durable goods can capture houses and other long term purchases
such as cars, whose associated debt contracts are also often specified in nominal
variable or fixed rate terms. We assume that both borrowers and savers work, although
all firms belong only to savers. In this respect our model is similar to the one developed
in (Calza et al. 2009) except that we provide a detailed modelling of financial markets.
We introduce the profit-maximising, price-taking financial sector model of (Graham
& Wright 2007), which has the attractive feature of capturing the simultaneous set-
ting of fixed and variable rates in a tractable, yet forward-looking way.2 Banks borrow
from patient households and lend to impatient households under either fixed or vari-
able rates and all debt contracts are in nominal terms, and overlapping Calvo-type
contracts ((Calvo 1983)). Every time the contract is re-written, the profit-maximising
bank decides on the amount of lending, but sets the fixed rate optimally as a price-
competitive firm3. The share of contracts with fixed rates is exogenous, however we
1The use of a ‘financial accelerator’ as an explanation for business cycle amplification dates back
at least as far as (Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist 1999). This term is also used in (Iacoviello 2005),
which includes impatient entrepreneurs tied to collateral based constraints, and in (Aoki, Proudman
& Vlieghe 2004) in the context of households with collateral based on house value. In contrast to our
Monacelli framework however, (Aoki et al. 2004) use rule-of-thumb consumers (who always consume
their current income), and there is no analysis of optimal monetary policy.
2See also (Gerali, Neri, Sessa & Signoretti 2008) and (Andres & Arce 2008) for similar profit-
maximising, price-taking banking sectors with unlimited lending.
3See also (Rubio 2009) where there are no overlapping debt contracts but actuarially fair fixed
interest rates on debt contracts. Although (Calza et al. 2009) define the fixed rate in a non-optimising
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investigate the welfare consequences of the different shares for a central planner. In
contrast to (Graham & Wright 2007), we do not assume a fixed size of collateral
for every household, but use durable goods as collateral for impatient households.
In essence, this paper combines the endogenous collateral constraint of the (Calza
et al. 2009) model, with the banking sector that optimally sets debt contracts at fixed
and variable rates as in (Graham & Wright 2007).
The paper is organised as follows: In the next Section we set up a two good —
two sector model with a financial sector. Section 4.3 defines optimal policy. We
discuss calibration in Section 4.5, and demonstrate how to find the steady state of the
dynamic model in Section 4.4. Section 4.6 presents results and Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 The Model
The model builds on (Monacelli 2007) and (Graham & Wright 2007). The economy
consists of two types of households, patient and impatient and two sectors — producing
durable and non durable goods respectively — each populated by a large number of
monopolisticly competitive firms and by a perfectly competitive final goods producer.
The relative impatience of one group of households results in their preference for
current consumption at the expense of future consumption (their marginal utility of
current consumption exceeds the marginal utility of saving). They choose to borrow
to maximise their utility and the patient households choose to lend. The presence of
household debt reflects equilibrium intertemporal trading between the two types of
agents, with the savers acting as standard consumption-smoothers. The borrowing
of impatient households is constrained by the amount of collateral of durable goods
that they can optimally accumulate. In what follows we will refer to impatient house-
holds as ‘borrowers’ or ‘constrained households’ and use subscript c to denote relevant
way, they focus on a different research question.
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variables. The patient household are ‘savers’ or ‘unconstrained households’ and we
use subscript u to denote relevant variables. Subscripts d and nd denote variables for
sectors that produce durables and non-durables correspondingly.
The financial sector in this economy is represented by financial intermediaries
which compete in quantity but not in price. Each household’s debt contract is rene-
gotiated (they ‘move house’) with constant probability, at which point banks have the
opportunity to maximise profit and choose the amount of lending. At the same time
they either apply the Central Bank’s rate to variable rate contracts, or apply the fixed
rate as determined by a no arbitrage condition.
4.2.1 Preferences
The period utility function for each household of type j ∈ {u, c} is identical:
ujt =
X1−σjt
1− σ
− κ
N1+φjt
1 + φ
(4.2.1)
where Xjt and Njt denote composite consumption, and hours of labour,
1
σ
and 1
φ
are
the elasticities of intertemporal substitution of consumption and labour, and κ > 0 is a
scale parameter capturing the relative disutility of working compared to consuming.4
For all households Xt is a CES consumption aggregator of the form:
Xut ≡
(
(1− α)
1
ηCut
η−1
η + α
1
ηDut
η−1
η
) η
η−1
(4.2.2)
Xct ≡
(
(1− α)
1
ηCct
η−1
η + α
1
ηDct
η−1
η
) η
η−1
(4.2.3)
where Ct is a (Dixit & Stiglitz 1977) (henceforth D-S) aggregator of differentiated
non-durable goods, Dt denotes consumption of durable goods, α > 0 is the share of
durable goods in the composite consumption index, and η > 0 is the elasticity of
substitution between non-durable and durable consumption.
4Notice that we follow the now conventional approach of building a monetary model in which
households do not derive any utility from holding money, see (McCallum & Nelson 2000) and
(Woodford 2003), Ch3.
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The differentiated goods are produced by monopolistically competitive intermedi-
ate goods firms, indexed by z ∈ (0, 1). Perfectly competitive final goods firms then
aggregate varieties into a single consumption good, so that standard D-S aggregator
for non-durable goods is:
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
ct (z)
ǫ−1
ǫ dz
] ǫ
ǫ−1
where ǫ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The corre-
sponding non-durable goods price index is given by:
Pnd,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
pt (z)
1−ǫ dz
] 1
1−ǫ
and the composite price index is determined as:
Pt ≡
[
(1− α)Pnd,t
1−η + αPd,t
1−η
] 1
1−η
where Pd,t is the rental price of durable goods. We assume that households are indif-
ferent between buying new or existing stocks of durable goods, which, if we pursue
an analogy with housing stock, means that once a constant rate of depreciation is
allowed for, there is no qualitative consumption difference between the service flows
from old and new houses. Demand for each individual variety of non-durable good is
given by:
ct (z) =
(
pt (z)
Pnd,t
)−ǫ
Ct
where pt (z) is the price of variety z.
The stock of durables is updated according to:
Dt+1 = (1− δ)Dt + dt
where dt denotes expenditure on durable goods, and δ is a constant rate of deprecia-
tion.
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4.2.2 Households
Savers
The optimisation problem for patient households is standard. Each household max-
imises their infinite horizon present discounted stream of future utility flows:
maxUut = Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−tu uus(Cus,Dus, Nus) (4.2.4)
where the period utility function uus(.) is defined by equation (4.2.1).
The budget constraint for patient consumers is:
W˜ut ≤ Aut +WutNut + Tut − Pnd,tCut − Pd,t (Dut − (1− δ)Dut−1) + Et
(
Qt,t+1D˜t+1
)
(4.2.5)
where W˜ut represents the value of the household’s end of period portfolio, Aut is
beginning of period financial wealth and government transfers are denoted by Tut.
The nominal wage rate from working Nut hours is Wut. Consumption consists of
both non-durable and durable goods spending, priced nominally at Pnd,t and Pd,t
respectively. D˜t+1 are dividends that realise by the beginning of the new period. We
define the stochastic discount factor Qt,t+1 with the property that the price in period
t of any portfolio with random value Aut+1 in the following period is given by:
W˜ut = Et (Qt,t+1Aut+1)
We also denote:
1
1 +Rt
= Et (Qt,t+1)
If the household holds riskless assets then:
Aut+1 = (1 +Rt) W˜ut
and the budget constraint becomes:
Aut+1 = (1 +Rt) (Aut +WutNut + Tut − Pnd,tCut − Pd,t (Dut − (1− δ)Dut−1)) + D˜t+1
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We also specify a limit on borrowing to prevent ‘Ponzi schemes’:
W˜ut ≥ −
∞∑
s=t+1
Et+1 [Qt+1,s (WusNus + Tus)]
and introduce the relative price of durables as:
qt =
Pd,t
Pnd,t
which allows us to rewrite the budget constraint in real terms:
Aut+1
Pnd,t
= (1 +Rt)
(
Aut
Pnd,t−1
Pnd,t−1
Pnd,t
+
Wut
Pnd,t
Nut +
Tut
Pnd,t
−Cut − qt (Dut − (1− δ)Dut−1)) +
D˜t+1
Pnd,t
Denote aut =
Aut+1
Pnd,t
, Πt =
Pnd,t
Pnd,t−1
, wut =
Wut
Pnd,t
, tut =
Tut
Pnd,t
, and d˜t =
D˜t+1
Pnd,t
to obtain the
simplified real budget constraint:
aut = (1 +Rt)
(
aut−1
Πt
+ wutNut + tut − Cut − qt (Dut − (1− δ)Dut−1)
)
+ d˜t, (4.2.6)
To derive first order efficiency conditions for the household maximisation problem we
then write down the following Lagrangian:
L =
∞∑
s=t
βs−tu
(
Uus + Λs
(
aus − (1 +Rs)
(
aus−1
Πs
+ wusNus + tus
−Cus − qs (Dus − (1− δ)Dus−1))− d˜s
))
where Uus is the objective utility function defined by equation (4.2.4), and Λs is the
shadow value (Lagrange multiplier) associated with the budget constraint. Defining
the partial derivative of the objective function with respect to variable x as δU
δx
= Ux
(marginal utility), we can write the system of first order efficiency conditions as (see
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appendix B.2.1 for a complete derivation):
Λt = −
Und,ut
(1 +Rt)
(4.2.7)
qt =
(
α
1− α
) 1
η D
− 1
η
ut
C
− 1
η
ut
+ βu (1− δ)Et
X 1η−σut+1C− 1ηut+1
X
1
η
−σ
ut C
− 1
η
ut
qt+1
 (4.2.8)
wut =
κNφut
(1− α)
1
ηX
1
η
−σ
ut C
− 1
η
ut
(4.2.9)
1 = βuEt
X 1η−σut+1C− 1ηut+1
X
1
η
−σ
ut C
− 1
η
ut
(1 +Rt)
Πt+1
 (4.2.10)
The budget constraint equation (4.2.6) determines the path of assets, and conditions
(4.2.7)-(4.2.10) determine the constraint shadow value, consumption of durables, the
wage, and consumption of non-durables respectively. Note that with unrestricted
access to financial markets, these conditions for patient households are standard.
Following (Monacelli 2009), equation (4.2.8) can be rearranged to give:
Ud,ut
Und,ut
= qt − βu (1− δ)Et
[
Und,ut+1
Und,ut
qt+1
]
(4.2.11)
This equation shows that patient households will make choices between durables and
non-durables in such a way as to equate their marginal rate of substitution, to the user
cost of durables. Taking the analogy with houses, the higher expected capital losses
due to relative house price falls; the more patient the rate of time preference, the higher
the rate of depreciation, and the higher the marginal rate of substitution between
future and present non-durable consumption, then the greater is the opportunity cost
associated with buying an extra unit of housing. In turn, this high opportunity cost
implies a desire for a relatively high marginal utility from housing services (and hence
lower total utility), and therefore less demand for houses. In this case, with perfect
financial markets, movements in the user cost are dominated by expected house price
movements (see (Erceg & Levin 2006)). Put simply, when house prices are expected
to fall, their re-sale value is lower, so their demand falls.
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Conditions (4.2.7) and (4.2.10) determine the stochastic discount factor:
Qt,t+1 = βu
Uc,ut+1
Uc,ut
Pnd,t
Pnd,t+1
(4.2.12)
In contrast to the Monacelli model, we also allow patient households to work. The
standard labour supply condition (4.2.9) equates the real wage (in units of non-durable
consumption) to the marginal rate of substitution between work disutility and non-
durable consumption utility. We assume perfect labour mobility, so household opti-
misation determines the wage, whereas profit maximisation by firms will determine
the amount of labour employed in section 4.2.3.
Borrowers
The utility maximisation problem for impatient households is the same as for patient
households:
maxUct = Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−tc ucs(Ccs,Dcs,Ncs)
where the period utility function ucs(.) is defined by equation (4.2.1).
In contrast to the inequality given by equation (4.2.5) however, these households
face a constraint that, given our assumptions, will be always binding. The relative
patience of the patient households ensures that (for small enough deviations from
the steady state), they always hold a positive value of real assets, aut, which in turn
is channeled through financial intermediaries to the impatient households. The real
budget constraint for an average impatient household is:
act =
(
1 + RDt
)(act−1
Πt
+ Cct + qt (Dct − (1− δ)Dct−1)− wctNct + tct
)
(4.2.13)
where RDt is the interest rate they face on debt, which as we will see in section 4.2.5
on bank behaviour, for a specific time t, need not be the same rate that patient
households earn. Similarly, although act is the real value of debt sourced from the
assets of the patient consumers, its dynamics also depend on the profit-maximising
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financial sector which channels assets via fixed and variable rate loans, as in G&W.
We write the constraint for an average impatient household who faces an average rate
on debt, and may or may not renew the debt contract at time t.
An important difference however, is that, as in the Monacelli model, impatient
households face restrictions on borrowing which are proportional to the variable col-
lateral value of the durables they own. In other words, we switch the financial accel-
erator on. The real value of collateral is defined as:
kt = (1− χ) qtDct (4.2.14)
where (1− χ) is the constant proportion of durable value that can be used as collateral.
In the case of mortgages on houses, χ would be the downpayment ratio, or the inverse
loan to value ratio, and is hence a measure of how much debt is rationed. (Kiyotaki
& Moore 1997) provide a careful story for the existence of this type of rationing, with
banks who lend to farmers with idiosynchratic technology. The difference between
liquidation values in the event of default and the value to the owner of collateral
leads to moral hazard, and enforcement costs lead to debt rationing. Here, following
G&W and Monacelli, we apply a similar argument: when banks lend more than the
proportion (1− χ) of collateral, the incentive to default kicks in, the probability of
default increases, and expected profits fall. Unresticted entry into the financial sector
also means that all profit opportunities are exploited, and so banks never lend less
than (1− χ).
Following G&W, we also assume that debt contracts are reconsidered infrequently,
with a Calvo-type stickiness parameter ρ, that we interpret as the probability that
the household moves house, and hence must re-negotiate its debt contract. At this
point the financial intermediary will decide on the maximum nominal quantity it is
willing to lend, at either a variable or fixed rate. It is assumed that variable rates are
driven down to the perfectly competitive central bank rate, whilst the competitive
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fixed rates are determined by individual bank optimisation, and hence are subject to
short term profits and losses. We demonstrate in section 4.2.5 that the evolution of
real average lending can be described by:
act = (1− ρ)
act−1
Πt
+ ρΥ(kt) (4.2.15)
Formula (4.2.15) suggests that real debt at time t remains the same as at t− 1 with
probability (1− ρ) when contracts are not reconsidered, and with probability ρ the
amount of borrowing is a specific function Υ(.) of the value of collateral owned at time
t. The household also knows that borrowing will be determined by the size of their
collateral when they make consumption decisions, which opens up the possibility of
using durable good ownership as a means of expanding debt, and hence consumption,
which in turn may fuel durable goods price increases, and so on. This feature captures
the growing phenomenon of Mortgage Equity Withdrawal in the UK, as discussed in
(Aoki et al. 2004), which may have amplified recent cycles in economic activity.
The Lagrangian for constrained households can hence be written as:
L =
∞∑
s=t
βs−tc
(
Ucs +Θs
(
acs −
(
1 +RDs
)(acs−1
Πs
+ Ccs − wcsNcs
+tcs + qs (Dcs − (1− δ)Dcs−1)))
−Γs
(
acs − (1− ρ)
acs−1
Πs
− ρΥ((1− χ) qsDcs)
))
where we have two Lagrange multipliers: the first, Θs, associated with the real bud-
get constraint, and the second, Γs, associated with the collateral constraint. The
associated first order conditions are (see appendix B.2.1 for full derivation):
Θt =
Und,ct
(1 +RDt )
(4.2.16)
Und,ctqt = Ud,ct + βc (1− δ)Et (Und,ct+1qt+1) + Und,ctρΥDc,tΞt (4.2.17)
wct = −
Un,ct
Und,ct
(4.2.18)
(
1 +RDt
)
Ξt = 1− βcEt
(
Uc,ct+1
Uc,ct
(
1 +RDt
)
Πt+1
(1− (1− ρ) Ξt+1)
)
(4.2.19)
CHAPTER 4. OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY 66
where the partial derivatives of the objective function with respect to Cct, Dct, and Nct
are written as Und,ct, Ud,ct, and Un,ct respectively, ΥDc,t is
δΥ(.)
δDc,t
, and we have defined
the shadow price of the collateral constraint as Ξt = Γt/Und,ct. The budget constraint
equation (4.2.13) determines the path of non-durable consumption, while conditions
(4.2.16) to (4.2.19) determine the shadow value of the budget constraint, consumption
of durables, the wage, and the shadow value of the collateral constraint respectively.
Rearranging condition (4.2.17) in the form of condition (4.2.11) for patient house-
holds we get:
Ud,ct
Und,ct
= qt − βc (1− δ)Et
[
Und,ct+1
Und,ct
qt+1
]
− ρΥDc,tΞt (4.2.20)
which is identical to condition (4.2.11) for patient households, except for the addition
of an extra user cost term (ρΥDc,tΞt) that captures how much the collateral constraint
restricts the ability of borrowers to purchase debt and acquire new durables. When
the shadow value Ξt = 0, the collateral constraint is not binding, and the nature
of constrained household demand for non-durables relative to durables coincides with
patient household behaviour. (Monacelli 2009) emphasises that, through this new col-
lateral channel, movements in Ξt affect constrained borrower behaviour, and can break
the normally strong link that exists between asset price movements and durable/non-
durable choice. Decreases in Ξt indicate a more relaxed collateral constraint, a rise in
user cost, and hence a lower demand for durables.
Similarly, in the absence of the collateral constraint, and with the appropriate time
preference and borrower interest rates, condition (4.2.19) collapses to the standard
patient consumption Euler equation (4.2.10).
In contrast to the Monacelli model, we have G&W nominal debt contracts which
are Calvo-sticky. As debt renegotiation costs approach zero (or the moving probability
ρ approaches 1), the stickiness of debt contracts disappears, and we have the Monacelli
case in which the full magnitude of the (expected future) collateral constraint Ξt+1
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becomes relevant. In this case, condition (4.2.19) is identical to equation (14) in
(Monacelli 2009). At the opposite extreme, as ρ approaches 0, debt contracts cease
to be renegotiated, the effect of changes in the collateral constraint disappears, and
the financial accelerator is switched off. Borrowers would no longer be able to use
the collateral of their durable good to expand consumption, but would still react
to changes in the rate on debt determined by banks, RDt . Our model would then
closely resemble G&W, although borrowers would still adjust durable and non-durable
consumption in response to changes in their relative price qt.
In general though, the parameter ρ defines our model as an intermediate case
between the full accelerator mechanism of Monacelli (ρ = 1), and the G&W case with
fixed collateral. There are, however, several differences with the model in (Monacelli
2007). First, because of staggered debt contracts, the marginal utility of relaxing the
collateral constraint for an average household has a relatively small impact if only ρ
-share of households are able to renew debt contracts. The collateral constraint can
only be weaker or tighter because of changes in price, not quantity. It also implies
that it is difficult for the household to move this constraint. In other words, although
with staggered debt contracts the presence of the collateral constraint in the user
cost increases the contemporary demand for durables, the effect is smaller with less
frequent adjustment. We shall discuss in Section 4.2.5 that the dynamics of ΥDc,t are
also affected by the proportion of fixed and variable rate debt contracts, Ψ.
Second, debt contract arrangements affect the way Ξt is determined in equation
(4.2.19). The effect is twofold. First, infrequent adjustment (ρ < 1) implies the future
constraint affects the tightness of the current constraint. As the constraint cannot
be moved immediately (but only with probability ρ) then the higher future Ξt+1
implies a higher net marginal benefit of acquiring today a unit of the durable asset
which in turn allows, by relaxing the collateral constraint at the margin, to purchase
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additional current consumption. Second, the proportion of fixed rate and variable
rate debt contracts affects the dynamics of RDt and so also affects the tightness of
the out-of-steady state collateral constraint.
4.2.3 Intermediate Goods Firms
In this section we derive firm behaviour in a standard way, with intermediate-goods
firms choosing the quantity of labour to employ and the prices to set goods at before
they are sold on to a perfectly competitive final-goods sector. Section 4.2.3 presents
these derivations for the non-durable goods sector, followed by the durable sector in
section 4.2.3. As before, subscript nd indicates employment and output in the non-
durable goods sector, and subscript d indicates the durable goods sector. In the non-
durable goods sector we have standard imperfect competition, with D-S differentiated
goods and nominal price rigidity. For the durable goods market however, given that
house purchases are usually negotiated individually, we use the baseline Monacelli
framework by assuming perfectly flexible prices.
We split profit maximisation of intermediate-goods firms by dealing with the two
problems separately: first, they choose labour to minimise cost intra-temporally,
and second, they choose prices to maximise the present value of future profit inter-
temporally. Each sector employs two types of labour: those from constrained house-
holds with subscript c, and those who are patient with subscript u (also consistent
with our earlier notation). There is perfect labour mobility, so for each type of labour,
wages are competitively equalised across all firms. We assume that the patient house-
holds own all firms, so their discount factor is used to evaluate the present value of
expected profits.
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Production of Non-Durable Goods
Firms in the non-durable goods sector choose employment and prices to maximise the
discounted present value of current and future profits:
max
{Nnd,cs(i),Nnd,us(i),p∗s(i)}
∞
s=t
Et
∞∑
s=t
Qt,s (ynd,s (i) pnds (i)−WusNnd,us (i)−WcsNnd,cs (i))
(4.2.21)
subject to a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production technology:
yndt (i) = ZndtNnd,ut (i)
ν Nnd,ct (i)
1−ν (4.2.22)
where Zndt is an exogenous technology shock, and the parameter ν captures the rel-
ative productivity of patient labour compared to constrained labour. In the case of
homogeneous productivity ν = 0.5.
Profit maximisation is also subject to the demand constraint:
yndt (i) = Yndt
(
pndt (i)
Pndt
)−ǫ
(4.2.23)
and Calvo price rigidity:
pnd,t (i) = p
∗
nd,t (i)
pnd,t+1 (i) =
{
p∗nd,t+1 (i) , with prob 1− θ
pnd,t+1 (i) , with prob θ
(4.2.24)
where θ is the probability that firms have the opportunity to adjust prices.
Employment Firm i minimises nominal cost:
min
Nnd,ct(i),Nnd,ut(i)
{WutNnd,ut (i) +WctNnd,ct (i)}
subject to the production constraint (4.2.22).
We can then write down the Lagrangian:
L =WutNndut (i) +WctNndct (i)− Pnd,tξt
(
ZndtNndut (i)
ν Nndct (i)
1−ν − yndt (i)
)
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where ξt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the production constraint.
The associated first order efficiency conditions associated with choosing optimal
quantities of patient and constrained labour are:
wutNnd,ut (i) = νξtyndt (i) (4.2.25)
wctNnd,ct (i) = (1− ν) ξtyndt (i) (4.2.26)
where the real wage is defined as:
wjt =
Wjt
Pnd,t
It also follows that ξt can be derived as:
ξt =
1
Zndt
(wut
ν
)ν ( wct
1− ν
)1−ν
(4.2.27)
and substituting ξt into conditions (4.2.26) and (4.2.25) we obtain:
Nnd,ut (i) =
1
Zndt
yndt (i)
w
(ν−1)
ut
ν(ν−1)
w
(1−ν)
ct
(1− ν)(1−ν)
Nnd,ct (i) =
1
Zndt
yndt (i)
wνut
νν
w
(−ν)
ct
(1− ν)(−ν)
Substitute real wages from conditions (4.2.9) and (4.2.18) to obtain:
Nnd,ut (i) =
yndt (i)
Zndt
N
φ(ν−1)
us C
1
η
(ν−1)
ut X
(σ− 1η)(ν−1)
us
ν(ν−1)
N
φ(1−ν)
cs C
1
η
(1−ν)
ct X
(σ− 1η )(1−ν)
cs
(1− ν)(1−ν)
Nnd,ct (i) =
yndt (i)
Zndt
Nφνus C
1
η
ν
ut X
(σ− 1η )ν
us
νν
N
φ(−ν)
cs C
1
η
(−ν)
ct X
(σ− 1η )(−ν)
cs
(1− ν)(−ν)
Next we define price dispersion ∆t =
∫ (pnd,t(i)
Pnd,t
)−ǫ
di, to allow aggregation of
employment:
Nnd,ut =
1
Zndt
NφcsC 1ηctX(σ− 1η )cs
NφusC
1
η
utX
(σ− 1η )
us
(1−ν) ν(1−ν)
(1− ν)(1−ν)
Ypt∆pt
Nnd,ct =
1
Zndt
NφusC 1ηutX(σ− 1η )us
NφcsC
1
η
ctX
(σ− 1η )
cs
ν (1− ν)ν
νν
Ypt∆pt
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and the marginal cost formula can be determined by substituting wages (equation
(4.2.9)) into equation (4.2.27) :
mct =
1
Zndt
κNφνut C
1
η
ν
ut X
(σ− 1η )ν
ut N
φ(1−ν)
ct C
1
η
(1−ν)
ct X
(σ− 1η )(1−ν)
ct
(1− α)
1
η νν (1− ν)(1−ν)
(4.2.28)
Price setting The setting of prices is standard, closely following derivations in
(Woodford 2003), Ch.2. Prices are determined by Calvo-type contracts, with a fixed
probability 1− θ that they will be fixed each period, and probability θ that firms will
have the opportunity to re-set their prices. Firms will then choose prices to maximise
the following expected profit function (4.2.21) which can now be written as:
max
{p∗s(i)}
∞
s=t
Et
∞∑
s=t
Qt,s (ynds (i) pnds (i)− ynds(i)MCs) (4.2.29)
where MCs = ξtPnd,t is nominal marginal cost. Note that wages here do not depend
on index i, since labour of each type is assumed to be perfectly mobile between sectors,
so wages for patient and constrained labour are equalised across all firms. We then
come to the familiar problem of maximising (4.2.29) subject to the constraints (4.2.24)
and (4.2.23)
At time s we only need consider the maximisation problem for the proportion θs−t
of firms that have the opportunity to set their prices at time t. Optimal price setting
can therefore be re-stated as (and substituting demand from equation (4.2.23)):
max
{p∗t (i)}
∞
s=t
Et
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,sPndsYnds
((
p∗ndt (i)
Pnds
)1−ǫ
−
(
p∗ndt (i)
Pnds
)−ǫ
MCs
Pnds
)
The associated first order condition is:
Et
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,sPndsynds (i)
(
p∗ndt (i)
Pnds
− µmcs
)
= 0 (4.2.30)
where the steady state mark-up is µ = ǫ
(ǫ−1)
and we have defined real marginal cost
as mcs =
MCs
Pcs
.
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Since we assume that patient households own all firms, we substitute their stochas-
tic discount factor (equation (4.2.12)), and rearrange condition (4.2.30) (see appendix
(B.2.2)) to obtain our price-setting system for the non-durable goods sector:
1− θΠǫ−1t
(1− θ)
=
(
Gt
Ft
)1−ǫ
(4.2.31)
Gt = µUnd,utYndtmct + θβE
[
tΠ
ǫ
t+1Gt+1
]
(4.2.32)
Ft = Und,utYndt + θβEt
[
Π
ǫ−1
t+1Ft+1
]
(4.2.33)
This system has the form of a New-Keynesian Phillips curve in the sense that current
marginal cost and inflation are linked to future inflation.
Because of staggered price contracts, the aggregate price in non-durable sector
evolves as:
Pnd,t =
[
(1− θ)
(
p∗nd,t
)1−ε
+ θP 1−εnd,t−1
] 1
1−ε
So the price dispersion ∆t =
∫ (pnd,t(i)
Pnd,t
)−ǫ
di obeys (see (Woodford 2003)):
∆t = (1− θ)
(
1− θΠǫ−1t
1− θ
) ǫ
ǫ−1
+ θΠ
ǫ
t∆t−1 (4.2.34)
Production of Durable Goods
In this section we derive the employment and price-setting behaviour for the durable
sector. Each period new stocks of durable goods are produced. The relative stickiness
in either sector is important, as discussed in (Monacelli 2009). Durable prices, espe-
cially for houses, tend to be subject to individual bargaining processes so we follow
the baseline framework of (Monacelli 2007) with perfectly flexible durable prices. We
use subscript ‘d’ for employment and output in this sector.
The profit maximisation problem takes the same form as in (4.2.21), and the same
production technology:
ydt (i) = ZdtNdut (i)
ν Ndct (i)
1−v (4.2.35)
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where Zdt is an exogenous technology shock in the durable goods sector, and the para-
meter ν captures the relative productivity of patient labour compared to constrained
labour, and which we assume is the same as in the non-durable goods sector.
Employment The nominal cost minimisation problem is:
min
Ndut(i),Ndct(i)
WutNdut (i) +WctNdct (i)
subject to the production constraint (4.2.35).
Write down the Lagrangian:
L =WutNdut (i) +WctNdct (i)− Pctζ t
(
ZdtNdut (i)
ν Ndct (i)
1−ν − ydt (i)
)
and the first order conditions are:
wutNdut (i) = νζtydt (i) (4.2.36)
wctNdct (i) = (1− ν) ζtydt (i) (4.2.37)
It also follows that marginal cost can be derived as:
ζt =
1
Zdt
(wut
ν
)ν ( wct
1− ν
)1−ν
(4.2.38)
and we substitute (4.2.38) into (4.2.36) and (4.2.37):
Ndut (i) =
1
Zdt
ydt (i)
w(ν−1)ut
ν(ν−1)
w(1−ν)ct
(1− ν)(1−ν)
(4.2.39)
Ndct (i) =
1
Zdt
ydt (i)
wνut
νν
w
(−ν)
ct
(1− ν)(−ν)
(4.2.40)
Then substitute real wages from (4.2.9) and (4.2.18) to obtain:
Ndut (i) =
1
Zdt
ydt (i)
N
φ(ν−1)
us C
1
η
(ν−1)
ut X
(σ− 1η)(ν−1)
us
ν(ν−1)
N
φ(1−ν)
cs C
1
η
(1−ν)
ct X
(σ− 1η )(1−ν)
cs
(1− ν)(1−ν)
Ndct (i) =
1
Zdt
ydt (i)
Nφνus C
1
η
ν
ut X
(σ− 1η )ν
us
νν
N
φ(−ν)
cs C
1
η
(−ν)
ct X
(σ− 1η )(−ν)
cs
(1− ν)(−ν)
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And finally, with flexible prices, output in each firm is the same, and aggregation is
straightforward:
Ndut =
1
Zdt
NφctC 1ηctX(σ− 1η)ct
NφutC
1
η
utX
(σ− 1η )
ut
(1−ν) ν(1−ν)
(1− ν)(1−ν)
Ydt
Ndct =
1
Zdt
(1− ν)ν
νν
NφutC 1ηutX(σ− 1η )ut
NφctC
1
η
ctX
(σ− 1η)
ct
ν Ydt
Relative Price Setting In the absence of the Calvo price rigidity constraint (4.2.24),
the setting of durable prices relative to non-durables is more straight forward (see ap-
pendix (B.2.2). Firms choose prices to maximise expected profit:
max
{p∗s(i)}
∞
s=t
Et
∞∑
s=t
Qt,s (yds (i) pds (i)− yds(i)MCds)
where MCds = ξtPnd,t is nominal marginal cost, subject to the demand constraint:
ydt (i) = Ydt
(
pdt (i)
Pdt
)−ǫ
The first order condition then is simply:
MCdt
Pdt
=
ǫ− 1
ǫ
= µ
from where the price of durables relative to non-durables (qt) is determined by:
qt =
1
Zdt
κµN
φ(1−ν)
ct C
1
η
(1−ν)
ct X
(σ− 1η )(1−ν)
ct N
φν
ut C
1
η
ν
ut X
(σ− 1η )ν
ut
(1− α)
1
η νν (1− ν)(1−ν)
(4.2.41)
4.2.4 Market Clearing Conditions
Total output is equal to the sum of consumption:
Yndt = Cct + Cut
Ydt = Dut − (1− δ)Dut−1 +Dct − (1− δ)Dct−1
Yt = Yndt + Ydt
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Similarly, total hours worked adds up to:
Nct = Nndct +Ndct
Nut = Nndut +Ndut
Nt = Nut +Nct
The net saving in the closed economy is zero:
Aut − Act = 0
and we divide by the same price index, so the same condition holds in real terms:
aut − act = 0
4.2.5 Financial Intermediaries
In this section we incorporate the (Graham & Wright 2007) model of financial sector
behaviour into our framework. Nominal debt contracts are typically renegotiated be-
tween households and financial intermediaries infrequently. (Miles 2004) for example,
provides strong evidence that UK households infrequently re-mortgage. Decisions to
renegotiate may come from either party: in the case of mortgages, households may
change jobs and move house. On the other hand, mortgage lenders in the UK often
provide contracts which are discounted or fixed for an agreed period, after which the
nature of the contract changes. Conditions for reassessment of collateral at future
dates may also be agreed. Whether the household or the bank trigger re-financing,
both situations are captured by simply assuming that all contracts are reconsidered
with probability ρ at any given period. In the (Graham & Wright 2007) model, re-
gardless of the type of contract — fixed or variable rate — with probability ρ, the bank
decides on the quantity of funds, Zt to lend to a borrower who provides nominal
collateral K. When the amount of debt is adjusted, the fixed rate is also changed
optimally, whereas variable rates are always set equal to the central bank rate.
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In this section we derive the optimal amount of debt, Zt, that banks will want
to lend the impatient borrower, based on the value of their collateral, Kt. In the
G&W model this is fixed, but we base it here on the value of owned durable goods,
as described by equation (4.2.14). Next, we describe implications for the evolution of
aggregate debt, and finally we derive the optimal fixed rate and the implied aggregate
average rate payable on impatient household debt. Any impatient household, when
resetting the contract, takes the proportion Ψ of the new debt under a variable rate.
This share can also be interpreted as a fixed proportion of households who are always
tied to variable rate contracts. We assume Ψ is exogenous and time-invariant for
simplicity and tractability, but we also investigate implications of different choices for
social welfare.5
Optimal Debt Offers and Aggregate Debt Evolution
At time t any loan contract is reconsidered with probability ρ. When the financial
intermediary adjusts the contract, it changes the nominal value of debt it issues,
issuing a new quantity, Zt+1. Its optimisation problem will be to maximise the present
discounted value of profit that will flow from this contract, so that at time t, it
will discount future periods s only for future scenarios in which the contract is not
readjusted, so using (1− ρ)s−t. In addition, since patient households own the financial
intermediaries, their stochastic discount factor (Qt,s derived in equation (B.2.6)) is also
used to discount the future flow of profit, so the problem is written as:
max
Zt+1
Wt =
∞∑
s=t+1
Qt,s (1− ρ)
s−t
s Φs (4.2.42)
where Φs is a flow objective.
It is assumed that patient households provide funds to financial intermediaries at
5Many (see for example (Maclennan et al. 1998)) have suggested that the different contract
structures observed between countries have evolved arbitrarily, in the sense that they are more
related to legal and institutional factors than economic.
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the central bank rate, so the flow objective of profit can be written as:
Φs = (R
z
s −Rs)Zt+1 − Ωs
where
Ωs =
̟
2
(
Zt+1 −Ks
Ks
)2
Ks
is the quadratic adjustment cost associated with deviating from the nominal value of
the collateral, Ks, and we denote R
z
s the rate that is offered on a new contract,
Rzt = (1−Ψ)Rt +ΨR
zF
t (4.2.43)
Lending more than the value of the collateral is risky, see e.g. (Kiyotaki & Moore
1997), while lending less than the collateral value does not extract the maximum
profit. So, the deviation from Ks is costly and parameter ̟ measures how large these
quadratic costs are.
The first order condition for the financial intermediary’s optimisation problem
(4.2.42) implies the following dynamic system for real debt (see appendix (B.2.3):
Zt+1
Pndt
=
Kt
Pndt
Mt
Bt
Mt = βu (1− ρ) Π
−1
t+1
(
Mt+1 + Und,ut+1
(
Rzt+1 −Rt+1 +̟
))
Bt = βu (1− ρ) Π
−1
t+1
(
Lt+1 +̟Und,ut+1KtK
−1
t+1
)
(4.2.44)
This system defines the dynamics of the profit maximising level of real debt that is
issued by individual financial intermediaries
(
Zt+1
Pndt
)
, as a function of inflation (Πt+1),
collateral, Kt, the markup of the average rate on debt over the central bank rate
(Rzt+1 − Rt+1), and the marginal utility of consumption of non-durables by patient
households (Und,ut+1). Real debt evolution is affected by the discount rate of patient
households βu, the stickiness of debt contracts ρ, and the parameter̟ (which captures
the relative size of quadratic costs associated with deviating from the target level of
debt).
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Appendix (B.2.3) shows how this behaviour translates into the dynamics of ag-
gregate debt. Since constrained households always take all debt offered to them,
constrained debt act as defined in equation (4.2.13) follows the same path, and we
have our final real debt evolution equation:
act = (1− ρ)
act−1
Πct
+ ρ
Mt
Bt
kt (4.2.45)
Rates on Debt
Each financial intermediary adjusts the quantity of loan it offers with probability ρ.
At the same time, we assume that the proportion of fixed and variable rates offered is
always the same as in the whole population. We can think of each individual borrower
as holding a portfolio contract containing fixed and variable rates, with the proportion
determined by exogeneous factors related to legal structure and convention. Later we
will be able to show what proportion will be optimal for welfare.
We assume that competition in prices between financial intermediaries forces vari-
able rates to adjust with the central bank rate each period. Fixed rates are fixed until
each new renegotiation, at which point the new fixed rates are reconsidered simulta-
neously with the quantity of debt. The interest rate on fixed rate contracts is then
determined by a no arbitrage condition where the financial intermediary is indifferent
between lending at fixed or variable rates:
∞∑
s=t+1
Qt,sR
zF
t (1− ρ)
t−s Zt+1 =
∞∑
s=t+1
Qt,s (1− ρ)
t−sRsZt+1
Appendix (B.2.3) shows how this condition can be used to derive the dynamic system
determining the new fixed rate RzFt :
Vt = βu (1− ρ)Π
−1
t+1 (Vt+1 + Uc,ut+1Rt+1) (4.2.46)
Ut = βu (1− ρ)Π
−1
t+1 (Ut+1 + Uc,ut+1) (4.2.47)
RzFt =
Vt
Ut
(4.2.48)
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The average fixed rate then evolves as a simple weighted average of the ρ proportion
of financial intermediaries who have had the chance to re-set the contract at time t ,
and the other (1− ρ) who have not:
RFt = ρR
zF
t + (1− ρ)R
F
t−1 (4.2.49)
So the average interest rate paid by constrained borrowers is:
RDt = (1−Ψ)Rt +ΨR
F
t (4.2.50)
4.2.6 Private Sector Equilibrium
A private sector rational expectations equilibrium consists of a plan for allocating the
sequence for {Xut, Xct, Nndt,Ndt, Dut,Dct, Cut, Cct, act,Πt, qt,Ξt} given the policy {Rt},
the exogenous productivity shock process {Zndt} and appropriate initial conditions.
The system describing the private sector equilibrium can be simplified to leave only
dynamic equations and important definitions, as summarised in Table 4.2.1.
4.3 Monetary Policy
We apply Ramsey optimal policy. Assuming feasible pre-committment, a plan that
maximises household welfare is delivered, subject to the economy’s resource con-
straints, and consistent with private sector equilibrium. Here we have heterogeneous
households with different time preference rates, and collateral constraints which can
be relaxed by purchases and price rises of durable goods. The impatience of the bor-
rowers in our model makes it impossible to jointly ‘satisfy’ both types of household
across time. We assume that the policymaking authority puts a relative weight on
patient and impatient household intra-period welfare, which in our baseline model is
the same as the labour share of these households. Specifically, the following welfare
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1 (eqn (4.2.2)) Xut =
(
(1− α)
1
η (Cut)
η−1
η + α
1
η (Dut)
η−1
η
) η
η−1
2 (eqn (4.2.3)) Xct =
(
(1− α)
1
η (Cct)
η−1
η + α
1
η (Dct)
η−1
η
) η
η−1
3 (eqn (4.2.8)) X
1
η
−σ
ut C
− 1
η
ut qt =
(
α
1−α
) 1
η X
1
η
−σ
ut D
− 1
η
ut + βu (1− δ)Et
(
X
1
η
−σ
ut+1C
− 1
η
ut+1qt+1
)
4 (eqn (4.2.10)) 1 = βuEt
(
X
1
η−σ
ut+1C
− 1η
ut+1
X
1
η−σ
ut C
− 1η
ut
(1+Rt)
Πt+1
)
5 (eqn (4.2.13)) act =
(
1 +RDt
)( act−1
Πt
+ ν (Cct + qt (Dct − (1− δ)Dct−1))
− (1− ν) (Cut + qt (Dut − (1− δ)Dut−1))
)
6 (eqn (4.2.17))
qt
(
1− (1− χ) ρMt
Bt
Ξt
)
=
(
α
(1−α)
Cct
Dct
) 1
η
+βc (1− δ)Et
(
X
1
η−σ
ct+1 C
− 1η
ct+1
X
1
η−σ
ct C
− 1η
ct
qt+1
)
7 (eqn (4.2.19))
(
1 +RDt
)
Ξt = 1− βcEt
(
(1+RDt )
Πt+1
X
1
η−σ
ct+1 C
− 1η
ct+1
X
1
η−σ
ct C
− 1η
ct
(1− (1− ρ) Ξt+1)
)
8 (eqn (4.2.32))
Gt =
1
Zndt
µκ
νν(1−ν)(1−ν)
C
ν−1
η
ut X
(ση−1)(ν−1)
η
ut C
1
η
(1−ν)
ct X
(σ− 1η )(1−ν)
ct
×
(
(Cct+Cut)
Zndt
∆pt +
Dut−(1−δ)Dut−1+Dct−(1−δ)Dct−1
Zdt
)φ
(Cct + Cut)
+θβΠ
ǫ
ct+1Gt+1
9 (eqn (4.2.33)) Ft = (1− α)
1
ηX
1
η
−σ
ut C
− 1
η
ut (Cct + Cut) + θβΠ
ǫ−1
ct+1Ft+1
10 (eqn (4.2.31)) 1− θΠǫ−1t = (1− θ)
(
Gt
Ft
)1−ǫ
11 (eqn (4.2.34)) ∆t = (1− θ)
(
1−θΠǫ−1t
1−θ
) ǫ
ǫ−1
+ θΠ
ǫ
t∆t−1
12 (eqn (4.2.41))
qt =
1
Zdt
κµ
νν(1−ν)(1−ν)(1−α)
1
η
C
1
η
(1−ν)
ct X
(σ− 1η )(1−ν)
ct C
1
η
ν
ut X
(σ− 1η )ν
ut
×
(
(Cct+Cut)
Zndt
∆pt +
Dut−(1−δ)Dut−1+Dct−(1−δ)Dct−1
Zdt
)φ
13 (eqn (4.2.45)) act = (1− ρ)
act−1
Πct
+ ρMt
Bt
(1− χ) qtDct
14 (eqn (4.2.44)) (1 +Rt)Mt = (1− ρ)Et
(
Mt+1 +̟ +R
z
t+1 −Rt+1
)
15 (eqn (4.2.44)) (1 +Rt)Bt = (1− ρ)Et
(
(Bt+1+̟)
Πt+1
qtDct
qt+1Dct+1
)
16(eqn (4.2.46)) (1 +Rt)Vt = (1− ρ)Et (Vt+1 +Rt+1)
17 (eqn (4.2.47)) (1 +Rt)Ut = (1− ρ)Et (Ut+1 + 1)
18 (eqn (4.2.48)) RzFt =
Vt
Ut
19 (eqn (4.2.43)) Rzt = (1−Ψ)Rt +ΨR
zF
t
20 (eqn (4.2.49)) RFt = ρR
zF
t + (1− ρ)R
F
t−1
21 (eqn (4.2.50)) RDt = (1−Ψ)Rt +ΨR
F
t
Table 4.2.1: Summary of dynamic system
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objective is minimised:
min
{Rt}t≥0
W =
1
2
∞∑
t=0
(
βνuβ
1−ν
c
)t(
ν
(
X1−σu
1− σ
− κ
N1+φu
1 + φ
)
+ (1− ν)
(
X1−σc
1− σ
− κ
N1+φc
1 + φ
))
(4.3.1)
subject to constraints summarised in Table 4.2.1, (4.2.2), (4.2.3), (4.2.8)), (4.2.10),
(4.2.13), (4.2.17), (4.2.19), (4.2.32), (4.2.33), (4.2.31), (4.2.34), (4.2.41), (4.2.45),
(4.2.44), (4.2.44), (4.2.46), (4.2.47), (4.2.48), (4.2.43), (4.2.49), (4.2.50) and (4.2.50).
Note that unless the policymaker discounts intra-period welfare of both types using
the same discount factor, consumption of those households whose welfare is more
heaviliy discounted rises unboundedly, since the relative share of them diminishes in
the policymaker’s objective. Our setup guarantees a unique, well defined steady state
under Ramsey policy (see (Becker 1980) and (Becker & Foias 1987)).
4.4 Steady State
Table (4.4) shows the recursive system to compute the steady state, following from
the system in Table 4.2.1 and given the steady state level of inflation Π. All interest
rates in the steady state are equal to R, and optimal policy then determines the steady
state rate of inflation.
Equations 1 and 12 from the table can be combined to obtain:
Ξ =
βu − βc
Π− βc (1− ρ)
which shows that the borrowing constraint Ξ does not bind without heterogeneity of
time preference, as in (Monacelli 2007). The reverse is also true: only a steady state
in which there is a borrowing constraint can be consistent with our economy with
households with different discount rates.
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Combining equations 4 and 12 from the steady state system gives:
Cc
Dc
=
(1− α)
α
(
(1− βc (1− δ))− Ξ
(1 +R) ρ (1− χ) (βu − βc)
(Π− βc (1 + R))
(Π2 − βu (1− ρ))
(Π− βu (1− ρ))
)η
qη
which shows that the steady state relative demand for durables is increasing in Ξ,
consistent with the idea that households will want to hold more durables, the higher
is the shadow value of the collateral constraint.
Equations 13-15 from the Table show that in the steady state, constrained house-
holds will be more highly leveraged, defined by a high ratio of debt to durable goods
owned, the higher is the loan to income ratio (1− χ) :
ac
Dc
= (1− χ) q
Πρ (Π2 − βu (1− ρ))
(Π− (1− ρ)) (Π− βu (1− ρ))
The presence of the banking sector with overlapping debt contracts affects steady
state allocations of consumption. In our analogue of Monacelli’s model ρ = 1. Relative
to that case, with ρ < 1, the collateral constraint binds less in the steady state, and
Xu, Xc, and Nc go down, while Nu goes up.
4.5 Calibration
We take the frequency of the model as quarterly, and so most of the parameters we take
from (Monacelli 2007) and (Monacelli 2009). The individual discount factor for patient
households is set to 0.99, consistent with an annual steady state real rate of interest
of 4%, whilst impatient households’ discount rate is 0.98. Parameters of household
utility are set as in Monacelli, with the elasticities of intertemporal substitution of
consumption and labour equal to one. We do allow some substitutability between
non-durable and durable goods however, by setting η = 1.5. In the non-durable
goods sector, the stickiness of price contracts is determined by the Calvo parameter θ,
which we set to 0.75, implying an average contract length of one year. The elasticity
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CHAPTER 4. OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY 84
of substitution between different assortments of non-durable goods is 6, which works
out as a mark-up of around 20%.
The parameter χ determines the down payment ratio, which we set to 0.25 (follow-
ing Monacelli). The deprecation rate δ for durables is set at 0.01 per quarter, which
represents approximately a 4% deprecation in housing per year.
We set the parameter ν = 0.5 so that firms demand 50% of labour from patient
agents and 50% of labour from the constrained households. We set α to 0.16, which
means that the consumption of durables constitutes 16% of overall consumption, and
non-durables constitutes 84%.
The interpretation of parameter ̟ is difficult, since it determines how large a
financial institution’s costs are when deviating from the target level of debt. We as-
sumed quadratic adjustment costs, as in (Graham & Wright 2007) for tractability,
but the costs associated with endogenous default risk and missed profit opportunities
relative to the size of the loan are hard to interpret, and indeed may not be symmetri-
cal. We chose a value of 3 in our baseline calibration and focus our sensitivity analysis
on ρ, the probability of readjustment, to see how the renegotiability of debt contracts
affects results. For policy objectives, we calibrate a = ν, so the social planner uses the
weights of the different types of household based on their labour share in the economy.
We study the propagation mechanism of an iid productivity shock in the non-
durable sector. We set the standard deviation of the shock to 0.1, implying a standard
deviation of inflation of around 0.5%, consistent with data in the UK.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Variable Rates
We study the propagation of a productivity shock in the non-durable goods sector
by introducing an iid exogenous process to Znd,t. Examining the economy’s responses
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to a simple one period shock then allows us to focus attention on the nature of the
transmission mechanism, and how it differs between economies with predominantly
variable rate contracts, and those with mainly fixed.
We first examine the effect of the presence of overlapping debt contracts. In a
baseline case, we plot impulse responses to non-durable (ND) productivity shocks in
an economy where the banking sector plays a very simple role, borrowing from patient
households and lending to impatient households under the collateral of durable goods.
This setup is very similar to the one in (Monacelli 2007) and corresponds to the case
ρ = 1 and Ψ = 0. All contracts are reset every period, borrowing is determined by
the value of collateral, and all rates are variable, so we denote it as the ‘no banking
sector’ case, as shown in Figure 4.7.1. We compare results to those in our economy
where we assume that 95% of borrowers are on variable rate contracts (Ψ = 0.05),
and that each contract is reconsidered every 2.5 years on average (ρ = 0.1). Although
variable rates adjust automatically with the central bank rate, the stickiness of debt
contracts restricts financial institutions’ decisions on the quantity of debt to issue,
which also depends on the amount of collateral of durable goods owned by constrained
households. Although households are able to use collateral to expand consumption,
they cannot smooth consumption as much as they would like.
Following a positive ND productivity shock real marginal cost in the ND sector
falls, and the maximisation of profit by monopolistically competitive firms implies a
fall in price and thus in ND inflation. The improvement in productivity allows firms
to employ less workers but still produce the same level of output (output will be
even higher because of increased demand). For those workers that remain in the ND
sector, wages go up, and because of perfect labour mobility between the two sectors,
this wage increase spills over into the durable sector. Here, there is no increase in
productivity, so employment falls in the durable sector as well. The rise in nominal
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wages in the durable sector increases firms’ costs of production, which in turn causes
the nominal price of durable goods to increase. This effect, combined with the fall in
the price of non-durables, pushes the relative price of durables (q) up.
The response of monetary authorities to this productivity shock is to initially
increase nominal interest rates, although by a very small amount (the increase is
much more pronounced in the model with ‘no banking sector’). Monetary policy only
slightly changes the interest rate in the first moment, which together with expectations
of high inflation in the future (when the productivity shock will disappear), allows
the real rate to be negative in the first period.
The negative real interest rate is inversely related to the change in the marginal
utility of consumption for unconstrained households, since a lower real interest rate
requires marginal utility to fall in the future. The initial increase in the consumption
of non-durable goods, therefore, is explained by the increase in real wages.
With durables relatively expensive, constrained households are then able to expand
debt levels to finance purchases. They also experience an initial increase in their real
wage, allowing an increase in consumption of both goods, but mainly non-durable
as they are relatively cheap. Also, with the stickiness of debt contracts, compared
to the Monacelli model, there are only limited possibilities to use durable goods as
collateral. In this sense, the financial accelerator mechanism that is fully operational
in the Monacelli model, and switched off in the G&W model, is ‘partly switched on’
here. It is particularly apparent from Figure 4.7.1 that in the model with ‘no banking
sector’ the constrained households try to accumulate far more durable goods than in
the model with overlapping debt contracts.
The initial rise in the interest rate in the model with ‘no banking sector’ essentially
prevents high borrowing. This is not needed in the model with overlapping debt
contracts as debt is relatively small (although more persistent), because of the partly
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switched-on financial accelerator.
In the second period following the shock, the initial gain in productivity is lost, and
marginal cost in the non-durable sector recovers to near previous levels. An increase
in marginal cost then leads to an increase in the price of the non-durable goods, and
real wages go down. The second period nominal interest rate level is well below the
steady state, in order to drive the real rate down even further. The low nominal
interest rate and high inflation rate at this stage makes borrowing relatively cheap,
so the amount of debt stays relatively high. The financial accelerator mechanism
becomes more apparent, as constrained households buy more durable goods, which
can be used as collateral for more borrowing. As patient consumers do not have the
same collateral constraint, they choose to reduce their consumption of the overpriced
durables significantly, but continue consuming non-durable goods.
This optimal monetary policy response ensures that constrained agents do not
face high deviations in their consumption path: the initial drop in interest rates keeps
lending and therefore the demand for durables high. The relatively high price of the
durable goods allows borrowers to secure against them, and non-durable consumption
for the constrained agent remains above the steady state.
Moving onto later periods, as the nominal interest rate returns closer to the steady
state, real interest rates also begin to increase. Combined with the trend back towards
the steady states for non-durable and durable consumption, this causes a slow reduc-
tion in levels of debt accrued by the constrained households. Nominal interest rates
substantially overshoot the steady state level after several periods in order to stabilise
inflation. As the future interest rate is expected to rise, the rate on fixed rate con-
tracts rises immediately. However, this has practically no effect on the economy, since
the majority of constrained households are on variable rates.
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4.6.2 Fixed Rates
We now change the proportion of households that are on fixed rate contracts, to see
how responses differ from predominately variable rate economies. Figures 4.7.2-4.7.5
demonstrate impulse responses of key variables, with the proportion of constrained
households on fixed rate contracts at 5%, 35%, 65% and 95%. In general, the transmis-
sion mechanism of the non-durable productivity shock is similar to the one discussed
above, except for the timing and strength of responses: with higher Ψ, the response
is more sluggish and less pronounced.
The first thing to notice in Figure 4.7.2 is that the amplitude of the drop in policy
rate becomes considerably smaller as we move to a fixed rate economy. In anticipation
of inflation-fighting hikes in the central bank rate, fixed rates rise early, since they
are linked directly to the expected path of short rates. As a result, the average rate
that constrained households pay on their debt is considerably higher for the fixed
rate economy, and will remain high for a long time. With higher Ψ the average rate
RD increases following RzF and it determines the flow of interest payments and the
tightness of the budget constraint. The rate also determines the tilt of consumption
towards future consumption. Figure 4.7.3 demonstrates a substantial delay in the
adjustment of consumption.
With higher Ψ the average interest rate RD increases in initial periods and so does
the tightness of the collateral constraint. A tighter collateral constraint leads to less
consumption of durable goods by the borrowers, whilst the lenders reallocate their
consumption towards durables, as their relative price does not rise as much as for
small Ψ.
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4.6.3 Frequency of Resetting
For an intermediate Ψ = 0.5, we demonstrate how longer debt contracts moderate the
financial accelerator mechanism even further. Figure 4.7.6 demonstrates that longer
debt contracts imply smoother adjustment of durable goods stock accumulated by
the borrowers; reduce the level of debt; and require higher interest rates in future
periods. In this way, the effect of longer contracts is the same as the effect of a higher
proportion of fixed rates. However, unlike Ψ in this model the value of ρ affects steady
state values as discussed above, so the welfare implications of changes in ρ may not
be unambiguous.
4.6.4 Welfare
The system under optimal control (under Ramsey policy) can be linearised.6 We are
able to compute the second-order approximation of social welfare along the optimal
solution (see Appendix B.1). As the steady state in this model does not depend on
Ψ, we only look at the measure of welfare that is based on the measure of volatility
of variables. We present these volatilities, as well as the welfare measure in Figure
4.7.7 (for any variable xt we plot E0
∑∞
t=0 ω
t (xtx
′
t)), based on the iid ND productivity
shocks.
Figure 4.7.7 demonstrates that the minimum volatility (and thus the maximum of
the stochastic component of social welfare) is achieved in an intermediate point, for
Ψ close to 0.5. Indeed, if Ψ rises then adjustment becomes slower. This immediately
implies higher welfare losses with higher Ψ. However, higher Ψ also moderates the
amplitude of immediate adjustment, which carries most of the weight in the discounted
flow of losses, so losses may also fall with Ψ. The minimum of losses is achieved when
6We solve the model using Dynare’s toolkit for Ramsey policy. The output produced by Dynare
is the linearised model under the optimal policy. The optimal policy itself is given as a linear rule
that includes feedback on Lagrange multipliers.
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the first effect outweighs the second. For our calibration of the model the higher ρ
(longer debt contracts) amplifies the first effect more than the second, and the loss
rises with ρ. The optimal Ψ in this model negatively depends on ρ.
The deterministic component of welfare, however, falls with longer debt contracts.
As the financial multiplier is tempered, the households are not able to smooth con-
sumption as they would like.
4.7 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to integrate a quantity-optimising banking sector that
lends under either fixed or variable rates, with a model with borrowing-constrained
households. We have provided a framework that can be used to investigate the rela-
tionships between the structure of debt contracts and monetary policy. In particular
we focused our study on the propagation of a productivity shock in the non-durable
sector under Ramsey monetary policy, and have showed that the introduction of over-
lapping debt contracts tempers the effect of the financial multiplier. Although the
implied steady state allocation of resources unambiguously reduces the deterministic
component of social welfare, an appropriate design of debt contracts, their length and
the interest rate composition, can reduce volatility of the key economic variables, and
banks can hence play a stabilising role in the economy. In particular, we demonstrate
that an intermediate ratio of fixed and variable rate debt contracts is socially optimal.
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Figure 4.7.1: Impulse responses to a productivity shock in ND sector with s.d. 0.005.
In the model with banking sector and overlapping debt contracts 95% of impatient
households are on variable rate contracts (Ψ = 0.05).
CHAPTER 4. OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY 92
0 5 10 15 20
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
x 10−5 Ψ=0.05, predominantly VR
 
 
0 5 10 15 20
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
x 10−5 Ψ=0.35
 
 
0 5 10 15 20
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
x 10−5 Ψ=0.65
 
 
0 5 10 15 20
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
x 10−5 Ψ=0.95, predominantly FR
 
 
R, central
bank rate R
D
, av.rate R
z
, av.rate
on new contracts
RF, av.
fixed rate
RzF, rate on
new FR contracts
Figure 4.7.2: Impulse responses of interest rates to a productivity shock in ND sector
with s.d. 0.005 for several values of Ψ.
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Appendix A
Monetary Transmission to UK
Retail Rates
A.1 Interest Rate Graphs
This appendix presents graphs of the 17 pairwise modelled relationships. For all
graphs, the x-axis is time during the sample period from January 1995 to May 2009.
For each pair, the graph on the left shows the interest rate levels throughout the
sample period, and the graph on the right shows their difference (the interest rate
spread). The line indicates the crisis period, August 2007. For a summary of variable
abbreviations, see Table 2.2.1.
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A.2 Unit Root Tests
This appendix presents four tests, two of which assume the null hypothesis of a sta-
tionary, I(0) process (the KPSS and Lo’s RS tests), and two assume the null of a
unit-root, I(1) process (the ADF and P-P tests). The (unknown) assumptions about
the true data-generating process vary according to test, and so ultimately does the
(unknown) trade-off between low-power (under-rejection) and size-distortion (over-
rejection), so the results should be treated only as indicative. Table A.2.1 shows that
all KPSS tests for stationarity are firmly rejected, whilst 10 of the 17 Lo’s RS tests
are not rejected. None of the tests for non-stationarity are rejected. For the pre-crisis
period, there is insufficient evidence to reject any of the tests, other than for the fixed
mortgage rate de-trended data.
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Table A.2.1: Stationarity Tests (Whole Sample)
Rate
SVR 0.23 (<0.01) 1.48 (<0.2) -2.6 (<0.9) -1.7 (<0.9) 
DVR 0.39 (<0.01) 1.75 (<0.05) -2.5 (<0.9) -2.0 (<0.9) 
LIBOR 0.24 (<0.01) 1.50 (<0.2) -2.0 (<0.9) -1.5 (<0.9) 
G1 0.15 (<0.05) 1.32 (<0.4) -2.5 (<0.9) -1.5 (<0.9) 
P1 0.16 (<0.05) 1.24 (<0.5) -2.6 (<0.9) -1.4 (<0.9) 
B1 0.20 (<0.025) 1.32 (<0.4) -1.8 (<0.9) -1.5 (<0.9) 
F2 0.44 (<0.01) 1.95 (<0.025) -2.9 (<0.9) -2.6 (<0.9) 
F3 0.45 (<0.01) 2.06 (<0.025) -2.7 (<0.9) -2.6 (<0.9) 
F5 0.52 (<0.01) 2.19 (<0.005) -2.7 (<0.9) -2.4 (<0.9) 
F10 0.58 (<0.01) 2.33 (<0.005) -2.2 (<0.9) -2.1 (<0.9) 
G2 0.18 (<0.025) 1.31 (<0.4) -3.1 (<0.1) -2.3 (<0.9) 
G3 0.23 (<0.01) 1.49 (<0.2) -3.4 (<0.1) -2.7 (<0.9) 
G5 0.35 (<0.01) 1.90 (<0.025) -2.9 (<0.9) -2.8 (<0.9) 
G10 0.52 (<0.01) 2.27 (<0.005) -2.3 (<0.9) -2.3 (<0.9) 
B2 0.21 (<0.025) 1.43 (<0.3) -3.0 (<0.9) -2.3 (<0.9) 
B3 0.22 (<0.01) 1.44 (<0.3) -3.3 (<0.1) -2.7 (<0.9) 
B5 0.29 (<0.01) 1.68 (<0.1) -3.2 (<0.1) -2.9 (<0.9) 
B10 0.43 (<0.01) 2.19 (<0.005) -2.5 (<0.9) -2.5 (<0.9) 
C10 0.49 (<0.01) 2.27 (<0.005) -0.8 (<0.975) -0.9 (<0.975) 
1. The Kwiatkowski et  al. (1992) test  of  I(0), against I(1)
2.Lo's (1991) R/S test for I(0) against I(d), for  d > 0 or d < 0.
3. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test  of  I(1) against  I(0). The number of  lags is chosen to opt imize the Schwarz 
information criterion over the range 0 to [T^1/3].
4. Phillips-Perron (1988) test  of  I(1) against I(0).
KPSS1 Lo's RS2 ADF3 P-P4
Ho: I(0) (stationary) Ho: I(1) (non-stationary)
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Table A.2.2: Stationarity Tests (Pre-Crisis)
Rate
SVR 0.02 (<1) 0.28 (<1) -2.1 (<0.9) -1.7 (<0.9) 
DVR 0.43 (<0.01) 1.78 (<0.05) -1.5 (<0.9) -1.4 (<0.9) 
LIBOR 0.06 (<1) 0.43 (<1) -1.9 (<0.9) -1.5 (<0.9) 
G1 0.06 (<1) 0.41 (<1) -2.0 (<0.9) -1.5 (<0.9) 
P1 0.06 (<1) 0.42 (<1) -1.9 (<0.9) -1.4 (<0.9) 
B1 0.06 (<1) 0.43 (<1) -1.7 (<0.9) -1.4 (<0.9) 
F2 0.32 (<0.01) 1.63 (<0.1) -2.0 (<0.9) -2.0 (<0.9) 
F3 0.33 (<0.01) 1.73 (<0.1) -2.3 (<0.9) -1.9 (<0.9) 
F5 0.38 (<0.01) 1.85 (<0.05) -1.6 (<0.9) -1.5 (<0.9) 
F10 0.46 (<0.01) 2.13 (<0.005) -1.6 (<0.9) -1.7 (<0.9) 
G2 0.07 (<1) 0.42 (<1) -2.4 (<0.9) -2.3 (<0.9) 
G3 0.08 (<1) 0.41 (<1) -2.5 (<0.9) -2.5 (<0.9) 
G5 0.08 (<1) 0.41 (<1) -2.6 (<0.1) -2.6 (<0.1) 
G10 0.09 (<1) 0.47 (<1) -2.4 (<0.9) -2.4 (<0.9) 
B2 0.06 (<1) 0.40 (<1) -2.3 (<0.9) -2.3 (<0.9) 
B3 0.06 (<1) 0.40 (<1) -2.4 (<0.9) -2.4 (<0.9) 
B5 0.07 (<1) 0.39 (<1) -2.4 (<0.9) -2.4 (<0.9) 
B10 0.08 (<1) 0.39 (<1) -2.3 (<0.9) -2.3 (<0.9) 
C10 0.06 (<1) 0.36 (<1) -2.3 (<0.9) -2.3 (<0.9) 
1. The Kwiatkowski et  al. (1992) test  of  I(0), against I(1)
2.Lo's (1991) R/S test for I(0) against I(d), for  d > 0 or d < 0.
3. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test  of  I(1) against  I(0). The number of  lags is chosen to opt imize the Schwarz 
information criterion over the range 0 to [T^1/3].
4. Phillips-Perron (1988) test  of  I(1) against I(0).
Ho: I(0) (stationary) Ho: I(1) (non-stationary)
KPSS1 Lo's RS2 ADF3 P-P4
A.3 Cointegration Tests
This appendix presents the Eigenvalue and Trace tests for cointegration between
the 17 analysed relationships, assuming both the null hypothesis of no cointegra-
tion (rank=0), and full cointegration (rank=1). Across the whole sample, the null
hypothesis of cointegration is never rejected, and for the discounted mortgage rate
relationships the null of no cointegration is firmly rejected. For the pre-sample pe-
riod, the null of no cointegration is rejected for all except the standard variable-rate
relationships, the relationship between 3-year fixed- and 3-year interbank-rates, and
10-year fixed- and corporate bond rates. The null of full cointegration is rejected only
for 3 of the discounted variable-rate relationships.
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Table A.3.1: Cointegration Tests (Whole Sample)
Relationship UVAR Lag 
Selection1
F2-G2 2 10.4 (<0.5)      1.6 (<1)      11.9 (<0.5)   1.6 (<1) 
F3-G3 3 9.5 (<0.5)      3.8 (<0.5)      13.3 (<0.5)   3.8 (<0.5)   
F5-G5 3 8.6 (<0.5)       1.8 (<1)        10.4 (<1)   1.8 (<1) 
F10-G10 3 13.1 (<0.2)      5.4 (<0.5)      18.5 (<0.1)   5.4 (<0.5)   
F2-B2 2 11.7 (<0.2)       2.8 (<1)      14.4 (<0.5)   2.8 (<1) 
F3-B3 3 10.1 (<0.5)      5.0 (<0.5)      15.1 (<0.5)   5.0 (<0.5)   
F5-B5 3 9.4 (<0.5)      3.7 (<0.5)      13.1 (<0.5)   3.7 (<0.5) 
F10-B10 2 13.9 (<0.1)      4.5 (<0.5)      18.3 (<0.1)   4.5 (<0.5) 
F10-C10 3 10.6 (<0.5)      1.0 (<1)      11.6 (<0.5)   1.0 (<1)  
SVR-LIBOR 3 15.4 (<0.1)      3.4 (<0.5)      18.8 (<0.1)   3.4 (<0.5)   
SVR-G1 4 10.4 (<0.5)      1.2 (<1)      11.6 (<0.5)   1.2 (<1)   
SVR-B1 4 14.3 (<0.1)      3.4 (<1)       17.7 (<0.2)   3.4 (<1)       
SVR-P1 2 10.2 (<0.5)      2.2 (<1)      12.4 (<0.5)      2.2 (<1)      
DVR-LIBOR 11 359.3 (<0.01)      4.3 (<0.5)       363.6 (<0.01)  4.3 (<0.5)   
DVR-G1 7 203.2 (<0.01)     3.4 (<0.5)      206.6 (<0.01)  3.4 (<0.5)  
DVR-B1 9 331.1 (<0.01)      3.4 (<1)      334.5 (<0.01)      3.4 (<1)      
DVR-P1 3 167.0 (<0.01)      7.6 (<0.1)      174.5 (<0.01)  7.6 (<0.1) 
1. Selected w ith the Schw arz Information Criterion.
Ho: r=0 Ho: r=1
Max Eigenvalue Test Trace Test
Ho: r=0 Ho: r=1
Table A.3.2: Cointegration Tests (Whole Sample)
Relationship UVAR Lag 
Selection1
F2-G2 1 45.6 (<0.01)     5.8 (<0.5)      51.4 (<0.01)  5.8 (<0.5)  
F3-G3 2 52.2 (<0.01)     7.4 (<0.2)      59.6 (<0.01)  7.4 (<0.2)      
F5-G5 3 14.2 (<0.1)      7.5 (<0.2)      21.7 (<0.05)  7.5 (<0.2)  
F10-G10 2 16.8 (<0.05)     6.2 (<0.2)      23.1 (<0.025) 6.2 (<0.2)   
F2-B2 3 17.2 (<0.05)     6.0 (<0.2)      23.2 (<0.025) 6.0 (<0.2)
F3-B3 3 15.1 (<0.1)       5.9 (<0.5)      20.9 (<0.05)  5.9 (<0.5) 
F5-B5 3 19.3 (<0.025)    7.5 (<0.1)      26.8 (<0.01)  7.5 (<0.1)   
F10-B10 2 21.9 (<0.01)     6.9 (<0.2)       28.8 (<0.01)  6.9 (<0.2)   
F10-C10 2 11.7 (<0.2) 5.8 (<0.5) 17.4 (<0.2) 5.8 (<0.5)
SVR-LIBOR 4 14.2 (<0.1)      2.2 (<1)       16.4 (<0.2)   2.2 (<1) 
SVR-G1 4 13.1 (<0.2)      3.2 (<1)      16.3 (<0.2)   3.2 (<1)   
SVR-B1 5 10.3 (<0.5)      2.6 (<1)      12.9 (<0.5)   2.6 (<1) 
SVR-P1 3 11.8 (<0.2)      2.2 (<1)      14.0 (<0.5)   2.2 (<1) 
DVR-LIBOR 3 334.7 (<0.01)     10.6 (<0.05)     345.3 (<0.01)  10.6 (<0.05)  
DVR-G1 3 308.5 (<0.01)     11.4 (<0.025)    319.9 (<0.01)  11.4 (<0.025) 
DVR-B1 4 338.9 (<0.01)     2.8 (<1)      341.7 (<0.01)  2.8 (<1)   
DVR-P1 3 316.3 (<0.01)     10.2 (<0.05)     326.5 (<0.01)  10.2 (<0.05) 
1. Selected w ith the Schw arz Information Criterion.
Ho: r=0 Ho: r=1 Ho: r=0 Ho: r=1
Max Eigenvalue Test Trace Test
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A.4 Lag and Lead Selection
I follow the suggestion of (Choi & Kurozumi 2008) to use information criteria, and
specifically their simplified Cp criterion (see (Mallows 2000)) which minimises bias in
simulations. This criterion is given by:
Cp =
1
σ̂2ε
T−u∑
t=l+2
ê2t,u + (p+ 1)(l + u+ 2)− T, (A.4.1)
where σ̂2ε =
1
T−umax−lmax
∑T−umax
t=lmax+2
ê2t,umax and subscripts l and u refer to the number
of lags and leads respectively. lmax and umax are their upper limits, chosen with the
suggested function of the sample size, T
1
4 ≈ 4. Table A.4.1 shows, for all 17 estimated
relationships, the selected P-L model with the chosen number of lags and leads in
parentheses (for example, a PL(2,1) model contains 2 lags and 1 lead), together with
those chosen with BIC and AIC criteria for the sensitivity analysis. Table A.4.2 shows
the estimated parameters for the cases where minimising BIC and AIC resulted in
different lags and leads.
Table A.4.1: Cointegration Tests (Whole Sample)
Relationship Cp BIC AIC Relationship Cp BIC AIC
S t andar d Var i a ble  Ra t e s Fi x ed Ra t e s
SVR-P1 (4,4) (1,0) (4,4) F2-G2 (2,1) (1,0) (1,0)
SVR-G1 (4,4) (3,2) (4,4) F3-G3 (4,3) (2,1) (2,1)
SVR-LIBOR (4,4) (2,1) (4,4) F5-G5 (4,4) (2,1) (2,1)
SVR-B1 (4,4) (2,1) (4,4) F10-G10 (2,1) (2,1) (2,1)
Discount ed Va r i abl e  Ra t e s
DVR-P1 (4,4) (1,0) (1,0) F2-B2 (2,1) (1,0) (2,1)
DVR-G1 (4,4) (1,0) (1,1) F3-B3 (2,1) (2,1) (2,1)
DVR-LIBOR (4,3) (1,0) (4,3) F5-B5 (4,4) (1,0) (2,1)
DVR-B1 (4,4) (1,0) (4,4) F10-B10 (2,2) (1,0) (2,2)
F10-C10 (2,1) (2,1) (2,1)
PL(L,U) Model M inimised with respect to: PL(L,U) Model M inimised with respect to:
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Table A.4.2: Cointegration Tests (Whole Sample)
Relationship R2 DW
Constant Slope Constant Slope Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
S t anda r d Va r i a bl e  Ra t e s
SVR-P1 PL(1,0) 2.67c 0.80c +0.26c -0.04c 1.00 2.06 0.000 0.000
(11.5) (18.6) (4.6) (-3.9)
SVR-G1, PL(3,2) 2.34c 0.88c +0.26b -0.04a 0.99 2.06 0.015 0.001
(9.3) (18.5) (3.0) (-2.2)
SVR-LIBOR, PL(2,1) 2.30c 0.85c +0.05 -0.01 0.99 2.06 0.008 0.002
(7.5) (15.4) (p=0.645) (p=0.404)
SVR-B1, PL(2,1) 2.31c 0.85c -0.05 +0.01 0.99 2.2 0.000 0.000
(9.7) (19.8) (p=0.524) (p=0.656)
Disc ount ed Va r i abl e  Ra t es
DVR-P1, PL(1,0) 0.23 0.97c +0.71c -0.10c 0.99 2.07 0.523 0.007
(p=0.403) (18.0) (4.2) (-3.6)
DVR-G1, PL(1,0) -0.11 1.06c +0.74c -0.11c 0.99 1.97 0.237 0.971
(p=0.663) (20.7) (5.3) (-4.2)
DVR-G1, PL(1,1) -0.02 1.04c +0.72c -0.11c 0.99 1.98 0.399 0.961
(p=0.930) (21.1) (5.1) (-4.2)
DVR-LIBOR, PL(1,0) 0.18 0.96c +0.63c -0.11c 0.99 1.93 0.336 0.000
(p=0.409) (22.4) (4.9) (-4.6)
DVR-B1, PL(1,0) 0.08 0.97c +0.54c -0.09c 0.99 1.88 0.564 0.008
(p=0.754) (20.6) (4.6) (-4.0)
Fixe d Ra t es
F2-G2, PL(1,0) 0.63b 0.98c 0.63 -0.08b 0.98 1.94 0.547 0.008
(3.0) (25.2) (4.4) (-2.8)
F3-G3, PL(2,1) 1.00c 0.95c +0.53c -0.07a 0.98 1.98 0.039 0.000
(4.9) (25.4) (3.5) (-2.2)
F5-G5, PL(2,1) 0.64a 1.04c +0.50c -0.08a 0.99 2.02 0.428 0.359
(2.5) (22.4) (3.3) (-2.6)
F2-B2, PL(1,0) 0.29 0.98c +0.48b -0.07a 0.98 1.99 0.567 0.023
(p=0.240) (23.2) (3.4) (-2.5)
F5-B5, PL(1,0) 0.02 1.07c +0.72c -0.12c 0.99 1.94 0.014 0.115
(p=0.881) (40.0) (5.2) (-4.5)
F5-B5, PL(2,1) 0.04 1.06c +0.65c -0.11c 0.99 2.02 0.062 0.261
(p=0.860) (30.8) (4.6) (-4.0)
F10-B10, PL(1,0) 0.02 1.07c +0.72c -0.12c 0.99 1.94 0.208 0.265
(p=0.881) (39.5) (5.2) (-4.5)
1. Pre-crisis includes monthly observations from Jan 1995 up to  and including July 2007, post-crisis from August 2007 to M ay 2009.
2. P-values fo r a Chi-Squared Test with Slope Coefficient restricted =1 (small value indicates evidence for incomplete pass through)
Significance levels of 5%, 1%, and 0.1% are indicated by superscript a, b, and c respectively, numbers in brackets indicate t-ratios
except for insignificant coefficients, for which associated p-values are given instead.
Pre-Crisis1 Post-Crisis Effect Ho: Complete Pass Through2
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A.5 Mean Adjustment Lag Calculation
This appendix shows how Mean Adjustment Lags (MALs) are calculated following
(Hendry 1995), for a short run equation that is initially specified in error correction
form. The general form for our SR(x, y) model can be written as:
∆rt = (β0 + β00D)∆it + δεt−1 + E(L) + F (L) + vt, (A.5.1)
where constants in the disequilibrium term (which do not affect the system’s dy-
namics) are not included; the error term (vt) is assumed to be a stationary iid process
(so can be ignored henceforth); and I define:
δ = ((1−D) (δ1λ+ δ2(1− λ)) +Dδ3) (A.5.2)
εt = rt − α1it − α3Dit (A.5.3)
E(L) =
x∑
i=1
βi∆it−i (A.5.4)
F (L) =
y∑
j=1
γj∆rt−j. (A.5.5)
E(L) and F (L) are lag functions that depend on the (assumed finite) number of
lags of the differenced exogenous (retail rate, rt) and endogenous (wholesale rate, it)
variables respectively.
From now on I use the standard lag notation, where xt−i = xt[L
i]
If we express the general form in levels with rt on the LHS and it on the RHS:
rt [A(L)] = it [B(L)] , (A.5.6)
then following the algebra on p.215 of (Hendry 1995), the MAL formula is:
MAL =
B
′
(L)
B(L)
−
A
′
(L)
A(L)
for L = 1, (A.5.7)
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where prime denotes the first derivative of the lag function with respect to L.
Then equation A.5.1 written in the levels form of equation A.5.6 is:
rt − rt−1 − δrt−1 − F (L) = (β0 + β00D)it − (β0 + β00D)it−1
−δ (α1it−1 + α3Dit−1) + E(L)
rt
[
1− L1(1− δ)− F (L)
]
= it
[
(β0 + β00D)− (β0 + β00D)L
1
−δL1 (α1 + α3D) + E(L)
]
.
We therefore have:
A(L) = 1− L1(1− δ)− F (L)
A(L)
′
= −(1− δ)− F
′
(L)
B(L) =
[
(β0 + β00D)− (β0 + β00D)L
1 − δL1 (α1 + α3D) + E(L)
]
B
′
(L) = −(β0 + β00D)− δ (α1 + α3D) + E
′
(L),
and so using formula A.5.7 we have:
MAL =
(β0 + β00D) + δ (α1 + α3D)−E
′
(1)
δ (α1 + α3D)− E(1)
−
(δ − 1)− F
′
(1)
δ − F (1)
. (A.5.8)
The functions E(L) and F (L) have the same form, which can be simplified for any
similar differenced lag structure, say G(L), in the following way:
G(L) =
n∑
i=1
φi∆xt−i
G(L) = φ1∆xt−1 + φ2∆xt−2...+ φn∆xt−n
G(L) = φ1(xt−1 − xt−2)...+ φn∆(xt−n − xt−(n+1))
G(L) = xt
[
φ1
(
L1 − L2
)
...+ φn
(
Ln − Ln+1
)]
,
so for L = 1, all terms disappear and we simply have:
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G(1) = 0. (A.5.9)
Taking the first derivative of G(L) with respect to L we have:
G
′
(L) = xt
[
φ1 (1− 2L) + φ2
(
2L− 3L2
)
+ ...+ φn
(
nLn−1 − (n+ 1)Ln
)]
,
which for L = 1 is:
G
′
(1) = xt [φ1 (1− 2) + φ2 (2− 3) + ...+ φn (n− (n+ 1))]
G
′
(1) = xt [−φ1 − φ2 − ...− φn] (A.5.10)
Substituting these results A.5.9 and A.5.10 into formula A.5.8 we have:
MAL = 1 +
(β0 + β00D) + β1 + ...+ βx
δ (α1 + α3D)
+
(1− δ)
δ
−
γ1 + ...+ γy
δ
. (A.5.11)
For the pre/post-crisis analysis, where δ = (δ0 + δ00D), we can calculate the MAL
for two cases:
Case A: Pre-Crisis Regime (D = 0), hence δa = δ0
Case B : Post-Crisis Regime (D = 1), hence δb = δ0 + δ00
MALa = 1 +
β0 + β1 + ...+ βx
δaα1
+
(1− δa)
δa
−
γ1 + ...+ γy
δa
(A.5.12)
MALb = 1 +
(β0 + β00D) + β1 + ...+ βx
δb (α1 + α3D)
+
(1− δb)
δb
−
γ1 + ...+ γy
δb
.(A.5.13)
For the asymmetry analysis we have δ = ((1−D) (δ1λ+ δ2(1− λ)) +Dδ3). There
are two different cases for δ, depending on the particular equilibrium correction regime.
For δ, as defined in equation A.5.2, these are:
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Case C : Pre-Crisis, Above Equilibrium Regime (D = 0, λ = 1), hence δ = δ1
Case D: Pre-Crisis, Below Equilibrium Regime (D = 0, λ = 0), hence δ = δ2
Using notation where MAL+ and MAL− denote Mean Adjustment Lags for Case
C and D respectively, we have our MAL formulae:
MAL+ = 1 +
β0 + β1 + ...+ βx
δα1
+
(1− δ1)
δ1
−
γ1 + ...+ γy
δ1
(A.5.14)
MAL− = 1 +
β0 + β1 + ...+ βx
δ2α1
+
(1− δ2)
δ2
−
γ1 + ...+ γy
δ2
. (A.5.15)
Taking the example of a SR(2, 0) model, the mean adjustment lags are:
MAL+ = 1 +
β0 + β1 + β2
δα1
+
(1− δ1)
δ1
MAL− = 1 +
β0 + β1 + β2
δ2α1
+
(1− δ2)
δ2
.
A.6 AForward-LookingModel of Retail Rate-Setting
This appendix outlines the conceptual model of (Mizen et al. 2004), which provides
an adjustment cost rationale for asymmetric adjustment of retail rates to changes in
policy rates. Retail rates also depend on forecasts of policy rates, highlighting the
potential for a relationship between current retail rates and future wholesale rates,
and hence the potential importance of using the P-L estimator to allow for this.
First of all, it is suggested that Banks are able to adjust their retail rates every
even period, whilst being able to make an additional adjustment in the following odd
period, but only at a fixed cost c. The monetary authority makes a rate decision every
even period, after which the bank sets its retail rates for the current and following
period. The loss function for the bank is quadratic in the deviation of the retail rate
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from its desired level, so the optimal rate at time 0 is:
r∗0 =
i0 + E0(i1)
2
. (A.6.1)
Following this, unexpected shocks to the policy rate can cause the desired optimal
retail rate to change (and in the even time period 1 where it costs the bank to make
such an adjustment). Say that base rates can be forecasted up to a white noise error:
i1 = E(i1) + ε, (A.6.2)
then at even time period 1 the bank would like to re-set to:
r∗1 =
i1 + E(i2)
2
.
There are two options for the bank at this point. Either it will be worth making
this adjustment to r∗1, if the gain from avoiding the quadratic loss outweighs the fixed
marginal cost of adjustment, or not, in which case it will leave its rate unchanged at
r∗0. That is, adjustment is worth it when this condition is fulfilled:
E
[
(r∗0 − i1)
2 − (r∗1 − i1)
2 + (r∗0 − i2)
2 − (r∗1 − i2)
2
]
> c
This condition can then be manipulated to give:
2(r∗0 − r
∗
1)
2 > c
[(r∗0 − r
∗
1)− E∆i]
2 > c
The second term is the expected change in the base rate, E∆i =
(
E1i2−i1
2
)
.This
means that the bank will not adjust iff the difference between its previously set retail
rate and the current base rate lies in a region around the expected change in the base
rate
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(
E1i2 − i1
2
)
−
√
c
2
< r∗0 − i1 <
(
E1i2 − i1
2
)
+
√
c
2
.
Appendix B
Optimal Monetary Policy
B.1 Welfare Loss
Suppose we know the evolution of the economy under control, to a linear approxima-
tion, is:
(Yt+1 − Y ) =M (Yt − Y ) +Bεt+1
where Yt is a state variable and the equation is written in terms of deviations from
steady state.1
Denote:
Zt = (Yt − Y )
then
Zt+1 =MZt +Bεt+1 (B.1.1)
In order to derive E0
∑∞
t=0 ω
tZt we take expectations and sum:
E0
∞∑
t=0
ωtZt+1 =ME0
∞∑
t=0
ωtZt +BE0
∞∑
t=0
ωtεt+1
We assume
E0εt+1Z
′
t = 0 (B.1.2)
so that:
1
ω
E0
∞∑
t=0
ωtZt =ME0
∞∑
t=0
ωtZt +
Z0
ω
1This is the default version of output in Dynare 4.04.
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where V = E0
∑∞
t=0 ω
tZtZ
′
t and Σ is the variance-covariance matrix of shocks. This
yields:
E0
∞∑
t=0
ωtZt = (I − ωM)
−1 Z0
Then we need to derive V = E0
∑∞
t=0 ω
tZtZ
′
t. From (B.1.1) and (B.1.2), if we
ignore all terms of the third order and higher and assume:
∞∑
t=0
ωtZt+1Z
′
t+1 =M
(
∞∑
t=0
ωtZtZ
′
t
)
M ′ +B
(
∞∑
t=0
ωtεt+1ε
′
t+1
)
B′
Therefore:
vec (V ) = (I − ωM ⊗M))−1vec(
ω
1− ω
BΣB′ + Z0Z
′
0)
Finally, for any arbitrary variable xt :
xt = NZt
it follows that:
E0
∞∑
t=0
ωt (xtx
′
t) = N
(
E0
∞∑
t=0
ωt (ZtZ
′
t)
)
N ′ = NV N ′
E0
∞∑
t=0
ωtxt = NE0
∞∑
t=0
ωtZt = N (I − ωM)
−1 Z0
Note that for any scalar function f of many variables:
f (Xt) = f (X) +∇f (X)
′ (Xt −X) +
1
2
(Xt −X)
′Df (X) (Xt −X) + ...
We can write:
E0
∞∑
t=0
ωtf (Xt)
=
∞∑
t=0
ωtE0
(
f (X) +∇f (X)′ (Xt −X) +
1
2
(Xt −X)
′Df (X) (Xt −X) + ...
)
=
f (X)
1− ω
+
∇f (X)′E0
∑∞
t=0 ω
txt
1− ω
+
1
2
tr
(
Df (X)E0
∞∑
t=0
ωtxtx
′
t
)
+ ...
=
f (X)
1− ω
+
∇f (X)′N (I − ωM)−1 Z0
1− ω
+
1
2
tr (Df (X)NV N ′) + ...
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B.2 Model Derivations
B.2.1 Households
Savers
Patient households maximise their objective function:
maxUut = Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−tu uus(Cus,Dus, Nus)
subject to the real budget constraint:
aut = (1 +Rt)
(
aut−1
Πt
+ wutNut + tut − Cut − qt (Dut − (1− δ)Dut−1)
)
+ d˜t
The associated Lagrangian is:
L =
∞∑
s=t
βs−tu
(
Uus + Λs
(
aus − (1 +Rs)
( aus−1
Πs
+ wusNus + tus
−Cus − qs (Dus − (1− δ)Dus−1)
)
− d˜s
))
For the partial derivative of the objective utility function Uus with respect to a choice
variable xs, we use notation
δUs
δxs
= Ux. FOCs are then:
∂L
∂Cus
= βs−tu (Und + Λs (1 +Rs)) = 0 (B.2.1)
0 =
∂L
∂Dus
= βs−tu (Ud + Λs (1 +Rs) qs)
−βs−t+1u Λs+1 (1 +Rs+1) qs+1 (1− δ) (B.2.2)
∂L
∂Nus
= βs−tu (Un − Λs (1 +Rs)wus) = 0 (B.2.3)
∂L
∂aus
= βs−tu Λs − β
s−t+1
u Λs+1
(1 +Rs+1)
Πs+1
= 0 (B.2.4)
∂L
∂Λs
= aus − (1 +Rs)
( aus−1
Πc,s
+ wusNus + tus
−Cus − qs (Dus − (1− δ)Dus−1)
)
− d˜s = 0(B.2.5)
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where the objective function partial derivatives are:
Und = Ux
∂X
∂Cus
=
(1− α)
1
ηX1−σus C
− 1
η
us(
(1− α)
1
η (Cus)
η−1
η + α
1
η (Dus)
η−1
η
)
=
(1− α)
1
ηX1−σus C
− 1
η
us
X
η−1
η
us
= (1− α)
1
ηX
1
η
−σ
us C
− 1
η
us
Ud = Ux
∂X
∂Dus
=
α
1
ηX1−σus D
− 1
η
us(
(1− α)
1
η (Cus)
η−1
η + α
1
η (Dus)
η−1
η
) = α 1ηX 1η−σus D− 1ηus
Un = −κN
φ
us
We can define the stochastic discount factor by combining FOCs (B.2.1) and
(B.2.4):
Qt,t+1 = βu
Und,ut+1
Und,ut
Pnd,t
Pnd,t+1
(B.2.6)
which implies that from period t iterating forward to period s we have:
Qt,s = β
s−t
u
Und,us
Und,ut
Pnd,t
Pnd,s
(B.2.7)
Finally, after rearranging, we obtain system (4.2.7)-(4.2.10).
Borrowers
Constrained households maximise their objective function:
maxUct = Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−tc ucs(Ccs,Dcs,Ncs)
subject to the real budget constraint:
act =
(
1 +RDt
)(act−1
Πt
+ Cct + qt (Dct − (1− δ)Dct−1)− wctNct + tct
)
and the collateral constraint:
act = (1− ρ)
act−1
Πt
+ ρΥ(kt)
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The associated Lagrangian is:
L =
∞∑
s=t
βs−tc
 Ucs +Θs
(
acs −
(
1 +RDs
)( acs−1
Πs
+ Ccs − wcsNcs + tcs
+qs (Dcs − (1− δ)Dcs−1)
))
−Γs
(
acs − (1− ρ)
acs−1
Πs
− ρΥ((1− χ) qsDcs)
)

We define Ξs = Γs/Und,cs and derive FOCs:
∂L
∂Ccs
= βs−tc [Und −Θs
(
1 +RDs
)
] = 0 (B.2.8)
0 =
∂L
∂Dcs
= βs−tc [Ud −Θs
(
1 +RDs
)
qs + ΞsρΥDc,s] (B.2.9)
+βs−t+1c Θs+1
(
1 +RDs+1
)
qs+1 (1− δ) (B.2.10)
∂L
∂Ncs
= βs−tc
(
Un +Θs
(
1 +RDs
)
wcs
)
= 0 (B.2.11)
∂L
∂Θs
= acs −
(
1 +RDs
)( acs−1
Πs
+ Ccs + qs (Dcs − (1− δ)Dcs−1)
−wcsNcs − tcs
)
= 0(B.2.12)
∂L
∂Ξs
=
(
acs − (1− ρ)
acs−1
Πs
− ρΥ [(1− χ) qsDcs]
)
= 0 (B.2.13)
∂L
∂acs
= βs−tc (Θs − Ξs) + β
s−t+1
c
(
−Θs+1
(1+RDs+1)
Πs+1
+Ξs+1
(1−ρ)
Πs+1
)
= 0 (B.2.14)
where the objective function partial derivatives are:
Und = Ux
∂X
∂Ccs
=
(1− α)
1
ηX1−σct C
− 1
η
ct(
(1− α)
1
η (Cct)
η−1
η + α
1
η (Dct)
η−1
η
)
=
(1− α)
1
ηX1−σct C
− 1
η
ct
X
η−1
η
ct
= (1− α)
1
ηX
1
η
−σ
ct C
− 1
η
ct
Ud = Ux
∂X
∂Dcs
=
α
1
ηX1−σcs D
− 1
η
cs(
(1− α)
1
η (Ccs)
η−1
η + α
1
η (Dcs)
η−1
η
) = α 1ηX 1η−σcs D− 1ηcs
Un = −κN
φ
cs
Finally, after rearranging, we obtain system (4.2.16)-(4.2.19).
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B.2.2 Price Setting
Non-Durable Prices
The FOC (4.2.30):
Et
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,sPndsynds (i)
(
p∗ndt (i)
Pnds
− µmcs
)
= 0
is rearranged as:
(
p∗ndt (i)
Pndt
)
=
Et
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,sYndsµmcs
(
Pndt
Pnds
)−(ǫ+1)
Et
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,sYnds
(
Pndt
Pnds
)−ǫ (B.2.15)
We substitute the patient household discount factor from equation (4.2.12) and define
the numerator in (B.2.15) as:
Gt = Et
∞∑
s=t
(θβ)s−t µUnd (Cus, Dus, Nus)Yndsmcs
(
Pnds
Pndt
)ǫ
= Et
∞∑
s=t
(θβ)s−t gs
(
Pnds
Pndt
)ǫ
and the denominator as:
Ft = Et
∞∑
s=t
(θβ)s−t Und (Cus,Dus, Nus)Ynds
(
Pnds
Pndt
)ǫ−1
= Et
∞∑
s=t
(θβ)s−t fs
(
Pnds
Pndt
)ǫ−1
where:
gs = µUndYndsmcs
=
1
Znds
κµNφνus C
ν−1
η
us X
(σ− 1η )(ν−1)
us N
φ(1−ν)
cs C
1
η
(1−ν)
cs X
(σ− 1η )(1−ν)
cs Ynds
νν (1− ν)(1−ν)
fs = Und (Cus, Dus, Nus)Ynds = (1− α)
1
ηX
1
η
−σ
us C
− 1
η
us Ynds
It follows that:
Gt = gt + θβEtΠ
ǫ
t+1Gt+1
Ft = ft + θβEtΠ
ǫ−1
t+1Ft+1
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The price level in the non-durable sector is determined as:
Pndt =
[
(1− θ) (p∗ndt)
1−ǫ + θP 1−ǫndt−1
] 1
1−ǫ
From where:(
p∗ndt
Pndt
)1−ǫ
=
Π1−ǫt − θ
(1− θ)Π1−ǫt
=
1− θΠǫ−1t
(1− θ)
=
(
p∗ct
Pct
)1−ǫ
=
(
Gt
Ft
)1−ǫ
And finally we obtain our price-setting equation (New Keynesian Phillips curve) for
the non-durable goods sector:
1− θΠǫ−1t
(1− θ)
=
(
Gt
Ft
)1−ǫ
where
Gt = µUnd,utYndtmct + θβEt
[
Π
ǫ
t+1Gt+1
]
Ft = Und,utYndt + θβEt
[
Π
ǫ−1
t+1Ft+1
]
Durable Relative Prices
Durable goods firms choose prices to maximise expected their profit function:
max
{p∗s(i)}
∞
s=t
Et
∞∑
s=t
Qt,s (yds (i) pds (i)−WusNdus (i)−WcsNdcs (i))
Hours worked by patient and constrained households from equations (4.2.39) and
(4.2.40) can be written as:
Ndut (i) =
1
Zdt
ydt (i)
(
Wut
Pct
)(ν−1)
ν(ν−1)
(
Wct
Pct
)(1−ν)
(1− ν)(1−ν)
=
1
Zdt
ydt (i)
W
(ν−1)
ut
ν(ν−1)
W
(1−ν)
ct
(1− ν)(1−ν)
Ndct (i) =
1
Zdt
ydt (i)
wνut
νν
w
(−ν)
ct
(1− ν)(−ν)
=
1
Zdt
ydt (i)
W νut
νν
W
(−ν)
ct
(1− ν)(−ν)
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Substitute into the profit function to obtain:
Et
∞∑
s=t
Qt,s
 yds (i) pds (i)−Wus 1Zdtyds (i) W (ν−1)usν(ν−1) W (1−ν)cs(1−ν)(1−ν)
−Wcs
1
Zdt
yds (i)
W νus
νν
W
(−ν)
cs
(1−ν)(−ν)

= Et
∞∑
s=t
Qt,s
(
yds (i) pds (i)−
1
Zdt
yds (i)
W νus
νν
W
(1−ν)
cs
(1− ν)(1−ν)
)
= Et
∞∑
s=t
Qt,s (yds (i) pds (i)− yds(i)MCds)
where MCds = ζtPdt. Note that wages here do not depend on index i, since labour
of each type is assumed to be perfectly mobile and so wages for particular household
type are equalised across all firms. So we come to the familiar formulation:
max
{p∗s(i)}
∞
s=t
Et
∞∑
s=t
Qt,s (yds (i) pds (i)− yds(i)MCds)
subject to:
ydt (i) = Ydt
(
pdt (i)
Pdt
)−ǫ
The problem for the optimal price setting at time t can equivalently be written as:
max
{pds(i)}
∞
s=t
Et
∞∑
s=t
Qt,s (yds (i) pds (i)− yds(i)MCds)
Substitute demand:
max
{pds(i)}
∞
s=t
Et
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,sPdsYds
((
pds (i)
Pds
)1−ǫ
−
(
pds (i)
Pds
)−ǫ MCds
Pds
)
So the FOC is:
∂
∂ps (i)
Qt,sPdsYds
((
pds (i)
Pds
)1−ǫ
−
(
pds (i)
Pds
)−ǫ
mcds
)
= 0
Qt,sYds
(
(1− ǫ)
(
pds (i)
Pds
)−ǫ
+ ǫ
(
pds (i)
Pds
)−ǫ−1
mcds
)
= 0
pdt (i)
Pds
− µmcds = 1− µmcds = 0
where µ = − ǫ
(1−ǫ)
and mcds =
MCds
Pds
.
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Real marginal cost will always be set equal to the constant ǫ−1
ǫ
, and switching to
time subscript t we have:
MCdt
Pdt
=
1
Zdt
1
νν (1− ν)(1−ν)
W
(1−ν)
ct W
ν
ut
Pdt
=
ǫ− 1
ǫ
1
Zdt
W
(1−ν)
ct W
ν
ut
Pdt
=
ǫ− 1
ǫ
νν (1− ν)(1−ν)
1
Zdt
(
Wct
Pndt
)(1−ν)(
Wut
Pndt
)ν
Pndt
Pdt
=
ǫ− 1
ǫ
νν (1− ν)(1−ν)
Substituting wages from the household FOCs (4.2.9) and (4.2.18) we then obtain:
1
Zdt
(
κ
(1− α)
1
η
NφctC
1
η
ctX
σ− 1
η
ct
)(1−ν)(
κ
(1− α)
1
η
NφutC
1
η
utX
σ− 1
η
ut
)ν
= qt
ǫ− 1
ǫ
νν (1− ν)(1−ν)
1
Zdt
κ
(1− α)
1
η
N
φ(1−ν)
ct C
1
η
(1−ν)
ct X
(σ− 1η )(1−ν)
ct N
φν
ut C
1
η
ν
ut X
(σ− 1η )ν
ut
= qt
ǫ− 1
ǫ
νν (1− ν)(1−ν)
B.2.3 Financial Intermediaries
Optimal Debt Offers
The present discounted value of profits associated with lending amount Zt+1 is:
Wt =
∞∑
s=t+1
Qt,s (1− ρ)
s−t
(
(Rzs −Rs)Zt+1 −
̟
2
(
Zt+1 −Ks
Ks
)2
Ks
)
So the FOC for choosing Zt+1 to maximise profit is:
∂Wt
∂Zt+1
=
∞∑
s=t+1
Qt,s (1− ρ)
s−t
(
(Rzs −Rs)−̟
(
Zt+1 −Ks
Ks
))
= 0
∞∑
s=t+1
Qt,s (1− ρ)
s−t (Rzs −Rs) = ̟
∞∑
s=t+1
Qt,s (1− ρ)
s−t
(
Zt+1 −Ks
Ks
)
(B.2.16)
∞∑
s=t+1
Qt,s (1− ρ)
s−t (Rzs −Rs +̟) = ̟Zt+1
∞∑
s=t+1
Qt,s (1− ρ)
s−tK−1s (B.2.17)
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We define the variables (replacing Qt,s with the patient stochastic discount factor of
equation (B.2.7):
Mt =
∞∑
s=t+1
Und,us
Und,ut
Pnd,t
Pnd,s
(βu(1− ρ))
s−t (Rzs −Rs +̟)
Bt = ̟
∞∑
s=t+1
Und,us
Und,ut
Pnd,t
Pnd,s
(βu(1− ρ))
s−t Kt
Ks
so equation (B.2.17) becomes:
Zt+1
Kt
=
Mt
Bt
(B.2.18)
and since variables with subscript t are constant across s, and defining a new variable
Lt =
Bt
Kt
, we can write:
Mt =
∞∑
s=t+1
Und,us
Pnd,t
Pnd,s
(βu(1− ρ))
s−t (Rzs −Rs +̟)
Lt = ̟
∞∑
s=t+1
Und,us
Pnd,t
Pnd,s
(βu(1− ρ))
s−tK−1s
Now, deal with Mt first. Define ms = Und,us (R
z
s −Rs +̟), rearrange, and use
the fact that for s = t, Mt = mt. Finally we define the variable M˜t =Mt +mt, so we
have:
Mt =
∞∑
s=t+1
ms
(
Pnd,s
Pnd,t
)−1
(βu(1− ρ))
s−t
Mt = −mt +
∞∑
s=t
ms
(
Pnd,s
Pnd,t
)−1
(βu(1− ρ))
s−t
M˜t = Mt +mt =
∞∑
s=t
ms
(
Pnd,s
Pnd,t
)−1
(βu(1− ρ))
s−t (B.2.19)
Equation (B.2.19) is a direct analogue of the Calvo price setting formula derived
in (Woodford 2003), with appropriate timing.
It then follows that the relationship between M˜t and M˜t+1 is defined by:
M˜t = mt + βu (1− ρ)Π
−1
t+1M˜t+1
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so replacing our definitions M˜t =Mt +mt and mt = Und,ut (R
z
t −Rt +̟) we have:
Mt = βu (1− ρ) Π
−1
t+1
(
Mt+1 + Und,ut+1
(
Rzt+1 −Rt+1 +̟
))
(B.2.20)
We can follow the same procedure for Lt to derive:
Lt = βu (1− ρ) Π
−1
t+1
(
Lt+1 +̟Und,ut+1K
−1
t+1
)
so that given our definition Lt =
Bt
Kt
, Bt is:
Bt = βu (1− ρ)Π
−1
t+1
(
Lt+1 +̟Und,ut+1KtK
−1
t+1
)
(B.2.21)
and we can rearrange the equation (B.2.18) for Zt+1:
Zt+1
Pndt
=
Kt
Pndt
Mt
Bt
(B.2.22)
Equations (B.2.20), (B.2.21) and (B.2.22) define the dynamics of the profit max-
imising level of real debt that is issued by individual financial intermediaries
(
Zt+1
Pndt
)
,
as a function of inflation
(
Π−1t+1
)
, collateral,
(
Kt
Kt+1
)
, the markup of the average rate on
debt over the central bank rate (Rzt+1−Rt+1), and the marginal utility of consumption
of non-durables by patient households (Und,ut+1). These equations also show how real
debt evolution is affected by the discount rate of patient households βu, the stickiness
of debt contracts ρ, and the parameter ̟ (which captures the relative size of quadratic
costs associated with deviating from the optimal level of debt).
Evolution of Aggregate Debt
Aggregate nominal debt Z at time t is the sum of all debt contracts written prior to
and at time t:
Zt = ρ
t∑
s=−∞
(1− ρ)t−s Zs = ρ
(
Zt + (1− ρ)Zt−1 + (1− ρ)
2 Zt−2 + ...
)
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It follows (since |1− ρ| < 1 we have the sum of a geometric series that converges and
is summable) at t+ 1:
Zt+1 = ρ
t+1∑
s=−∞
(1− ρ)t+1−s Zs = ρ
(
Zt+1 + (1− ρ)Zt + (1− ρ)
2 Zt−1 + ...
)
= ρZt+1 + ρ (1− ρ)Zt + ρ (1− ρ)
2 Zt−1 + ...
= ρZt+1 + (1− ρ) ρ (Zt + (1− ρ)Zt−1 + ...)
= ρZt+1 + (1− ρ)Zt
so:
Zt =
1
(1− ρ)
Zt+1 −
ρ
(1− ρ)
Zt+1
Divide by the non-durable good price index, and substitute the individual quantity of
debt issued, Zt+1, as determined by equation (B.2.22) (we define real collateral with
lower case kt):
Zt
Pndt
=
1
(1− ρ)
Zt+1
Pndt
−
ρ
(1− ρ)
Zt+1
Pndt
Zt
Pndt−1
Pndt−1
Pndt
=
1
(1− ρ)
Zt+1
Pndt
−
ρ
(1− ρ)
Mt
Bt
kt (B.2.23)
Since constrained households always take all debt offered to them by financial inter-
mediaries, the constrained debt act defined in equation (4.2.13) follows the dynamics
of Zt+1
Pnd,t
. We can therefore re-write equation (B.2.23) as:
act−1 =
Πt
(1− ρ)
(
act − ρ
Mt
Bt
kt
)
act = (1− ρ)
act−1
Πct
+ ρ
Mt
Bt
kt
Rates on Debt
Its optimisation problem will be to maximise the present discounted value of profit
that will flow from this contract, so that at time t, it will discount future periods s
only for future scenarios in which the contract is not readjusted, so using (1− ρ)s−t.
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In addition, since patient households own the financial intermediaries, their stochastic
discount factor (Qt,s derived in equation (B.2.6)) is also used to discount the future
flow of profit, so the problem is written as:
The optimal rate set on new fixed rate contracts, RzFt , is determined by a no
arbitrage condition that equates the present value of future expected revenues from
the variable and fixed rate contracts. As for the determination of the optimal quantity
of debt, at time t the financial intermediary will discount future periods s only for
future scenarios in which the contract is not readjusted, so using (1− ρ)s−t. As before,
the patient households’ stochastic discount factor (Qt,s derived in equation (B.2.6)) is
also used to discount the future flow of profit, so the problem is written as:
∞∑
s=t+1
Qt,sR
zF
t (1− ρ)
t−s Zt+1 =
∞∑
s=t+1
Qt,s (1− ρ)
t−sRsZt+1
RzFt =
∑∞
s=t+1Qt,s (1− ρ)
t−sRs∑∞
s=t+1Qt,s (1− ρ)
t−s (B.2.24)
We define the variables (replacing Qt,s with the patient stochastic discount factor of
equation (B.2.7)):
Vt =
∞∑
s=t+1
βs−tu
Und,us
Und,ut
Pnd,t
Pnd,s
(1− ρ)t−sRs
Ut =
∞∑
s=t+1
βs−tu
Und,us
Und,ut
Pnd,t
Pnd,s
(1− ρ)s−t
RzFt =
Vt
Ut
(B.2.25)
and since variables with subscript t are constant across s we can write:
Vt =
∞∑
s=t+1
(βu (1− ρ))
s−t Und,usRs
(
Pnds
Pndt
)−1
Ut =
∞∑
s=t+1
(βu (1− ρ))
s−t Und,us
(
Pnds
Pndt
)−1
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As for the determination of debt, we organise Vt and Ut into the same form as for
Calvo pricing in (Woodford 2003). Dealing with Vt first we define vs = Und,usRs, then
use the fact that for s = t, Vt = vt, and define V˜t = Vt + vt so we have:
Vt =
∞∑
s=t+1
(βu (1− ρ))
s−t vs
(
Pnds
Pndt
)−1
Vt = −vt +
∞∑
s=t
(βu (1− ρ))
s−t vs
(
Pnds
Pndt
)−1
V˜t = Vt + vt =
∞∑
s=t
(βu (1− ρ))
s−t vs
(
Pnds
Pndt
)−1
(B.2.26)
It then follows that the relationship between V˜t and V˜t+1 is defined by:
V˜t = vs + βu (1− ρ) Π
−1
t+1V˜t+1
so replacing our definitions V˜t = Vt + vt and vt = Und,utRt we have:
Vt = βu (1− ρ) Π
−1
t+1 (Vt+1 + Und,ut+1Rt+1) (B.2.27)
We can follow the same procedure for Ut to derive:
Ut = βu (1− ρ) Π
−1
t+1 (Ut+1 + Und,ut+1) (B.2.28)
Equation (B.2.25) combined with (B.2.27) and (B.2.28) describe the dynamics of the
new fixed rates RzFt set each period by those financial intermediaries who have the
opportunity to re-set the contract.
B.2.4 Profits of Firms and Financial intermediaries
Aggregate intra-period nominal profit in non-durable goods sector is
Πndt = PndtYndt −WutNnd,ut −WctNnd,ct
= PndtYndt − PndtwutNndut − PndtwctNndct
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And in the durable goods sector it is
Πdt = PndtYdt −WutNdut −WctNdct
= PndtqtYdt − PndtwutNdut − PndtwctNdct
Total nominal profit is
Π˜t = Πpt +Πdt = PndtYpt − PndtwutNput − PndtwctNpct
+PndtqtYdt − PndtwutNdut − PndtwctNdct
= PndtYpt + PndtqtYdt − Pndtwut (Nput +Ndut)− Pndtwct (Npct +Ndct)
= PndtYpt + PndtqtYdt − PndtwutNut − PndtwctNct (B.2.29)
We assume that the profit is 100% taxed by the government and redistributed accord-
ing to the following rule:
tct = (1− x)
Π˜t
Pndt
tut = x
Π˜t
Pndt
where x = ν in the simplest case, but we can also look at more general case, so I leave
it with x for now. We can keep at as a parameter for now. From (B.2.29) it follows
that
PndtYpt + PndtqtYdt −WutNut −WctNct = Π˜t = Pndttct + Pndttut (B.2.30)
We can substitute it in budget constraint and will do it later.
tct = (1− x) (Ypt + qtYdt − wutNut − wctNct)
tut = x (Ypt + qtYdt − wutNut − wctNct)
The two budget constraints:
aut = (1 +Rt)
(
aut−1
Πc,t
+ wutNut + tut − Cut − qt (Dut − (1− δ)Dut−1)
)
+ d˜t,
(B.2.31)
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act =
(
1 +RDt
)(act−1
Πc,t
+ Cct + qt (Dct − (1− δ)Dct−1)− wctNct − tct
)
imply that aggregate real profits of financial intermediaries that is distributed as
dividends:
d˜t =
(
RDt −Rt
)(act−1
Πc,t
+ Cct + qt (Dct − (1− δ)Dct−1)− wctNct − tct
)
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